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Community-driven development (CDD) has attracted 
the attention of governments and international organizations through its 
promise of sustainable, pro-poor development that involves local communities 
in program design and decisionmaking. Empirical evidence of CDD’s eﬀective-
ness has not been very strong, however, with some studies providing support 
to CDDs and others not. This study addresses this problem, oﬀering fresh 
analysis of CDD programs by assessing the Fadama II Project, the largest 
agricultural CDD program in Nigeria. Fadama II aimed to increase the income 
of farmers, ﬁshers, and other poor people in Nigeria’s low-lying ﬂoodplains, or 
fadama areas, where poverty is concentrated. Drawing on a survey of the 
experiences of almost two thousand Nigerians—both Fadama II participants 
and those outside the project’s parameters—the authors identify key strengths 
and weaknesses of the program. Fadama II has succeeded in raising beneﬁcia-
ries’ real incomes by roughly 60 percent and dramatically increasing the value 
of productive assets owned by private and civil society organizations. More-
over, by promoting public goods such as roads, Fadama II has even beneﬁted 
people who were not participants in the project. Nevertheless, the poorest 
households, including those headed by women, have yet to see their incomes 
increase as dramatically as those of better-oﬀ households. Also, participation 
in Fadama II depended partially on ﬁnancial contributions often beyond the 
means of poorer households. Future CDD programs need to address these 
problems through improved targeting of poor and vulnerable groups, creation 
of aﬀordable rural credit services, and other reforms. This study oﬀers a 
carefully balanced analysis that will be valuable to policymakers, donors, and 
others interested in the potential of community-driven development.   
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viiForeword
T
he concept of community-driven development (CDD) has become popu-
lar because it promises to foster sustainable development projects 
that are responsive to local priorities, empower local communities, and 
target poor and vulnerable groups. This research monograph assesses the 
impacts of the largest agricultural CDD project in Nigeria, Fadama II, which 
was carried out by the Nigerian government in partnership with the World 
Bank. 
  The results show that Fadama II dramatically increased the value of 
group-owned productive assets, in both absolute value and percentage terms, 
across all agroecological zones, asset terciles, and genders. Participation in 
the project also increased the income of beneficiaries by about 60 percent—
well above the targeted increase of 20 percent over the six-year term of the 
project. However, the incomes of beneficiaries in the poorest asset tercile 
and of female household heads did not grow significantly, at least during 
the six-year span of the project. And even though the program successfully 
targeted the poor through its group-owned productive assets component, it 
did not help beneficiaries to invest in the complementary inputs required to 
make full use of their productive assets. 
  The results suggest that the poor need help in accessing affordable rural 
credit services, which can provide the means to pay for productive assets. 
Although Fadama II did not focus on this issue, the Fadama III project (which 
began in late 2008) has addressed this problem.
  The approach undertaken in Fadama II is a unique and innovative way to 
reduce poverty. As IFPRI’s research indicates, Fadama II is a success story 
that can serve as a good example for poverty-reduction programs in Africa 





igeria is aggressively implementing rural development programs 
aimed at significantly reducing poverty. The objective of the country’s 
development strategy, the 20:2020 Vision, for example, is to make 
Nigeria one of the 20 largest economies in the world by the year 2020. These 
efforts have produced promising results in the past ten years, when the gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew by an annual average of 7 percent—more than 
double the 2.6–3.0 percent growth rate the country achieved from 1990 to 
1999. The agricultural sector contributed about 47 percent of the GDP growth 
between 1990 and 2007, the largest contribution from a single sector. Despite 
this impressive growth, however, poverty in Nigeria remains entrenched. An 
estimated 54 percent of the Nigerian population lives below the poverty line, 
suggesting that the majority of the poor are being bypassed by these impressive 
achievements. What must policymakers do to target the poor?
  Government initiatives such as the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategies (NEEDS and NEEDS II) are currently being designed to 
empower the poor and vulnerable to escape from poverty and to participate in 
designing new publicly funded development programs. The Fadama II project 
was one such program intended to target and empower the poor. Consistent 
with NEEDS and other poverty-reduction programs, Fadama II followed the 
community-driven development (CDD) model of empowering communities to 
plan and implement publicly funded projects. Fadama II has produced impres-
sive outcomes that have helped Nigerian policymakers and development part-
ners to implement poverty-reduction programs. Of particular interest to the 
Nigerian government is Fadama II’s success in targeting the poor. This success 
provides a lesson not only for Nigeria, but also for other countries designing 
similar programs. 
  In recognition of Fadama II’s impressive achievement, the project received 
the 2008 World Bank Africa Award for excellence. The government of Nigeria 
and the World Bank have also taken the bold step of scaling up this impres-
sive achievement to span the entire country. This decision was influenced by 
Fadama II’s success and the government’s desire to target the poor. 
  Since many programs attempt to reduce poverty in Nigeria, IFPRI used 
an innovative approach to identify those observed outcomes attributable to 
Fadama II. The study offers insights into Fadama II’s impacts and how the 
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CDD approach has been able to target the poor—an objective that appar-
ently eluded the programs contributing to the impressive GDP growth of 
the past decade. The study offers important lessons on a CDD program, its 
strengths and weaknesses, and how the effectiveness of CDD programs can 
be enhanced. 
  We thank IFPRI for conducting and publishing this study. This publication 
will certainly help policymakers and development partners as they design 
programs for achieving the 2020 Vision, NEEDS, and other poverty-reduction 
objectives. 
Prof. Sheikh Ahmed Abdullah 
Honorable Minister
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T
he community-driven development (CDD) approach has become in-
creasingly popular because of its potential to develop projects that 
are sustainable, are responsive to local priorities, empower communi-
ties, and more effectively target poor and vulnerable groups. The purpose 
of this study is to assess the impacts of Fadama II, which is a CDD project 
and the largest agricultural project in Nigeria. This study used propensity 
score matching (PSM) to select 1,728 comparable project beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries. The study also used double difference methods to compare 
the impact indicators.
  Our results show that Fadama II succeeded in targeting the poor and female 
household heads in its group-owned productive asset acquisition component. 
Participation in the project also increased the income of beneficiaries by about 
60 percent, which is well above the targeted increase of 20 percent in the six-
year period of the project. However, incomes of beneficiaries in the poorest 
asset tercile and among female household heads did not change significantly 
in the first year. Thus even though the program successfully targeted the poor 
through its group-owned productive assets component, there was an unmet 
need to support beneficiaries to invest in complementary inputs required to 
make full use of their productive assets. The impact of the program also needs 
to be verified by monitoring its trend over a longer time—especially among the 
poorest households and those headed by women. Comparison of nonbeneficia-
ries residing in Fadama II local government authorities (LGAs) and those out-
side Fadama II LGAs showed a significant spillover of Fadama II to nonbenefi-
ciaries. The incomes of nonbeneficiaries residing in Fadama II LGAs increased 
by 18 percent because of spillovers from the Fadama II program through public 
investments, such as community roads, advisory services, and other services.
  We also observed that Fadama II increased the demand for postharvest 
handling technologies but did not have a significant impact on the demand 
for financial management and market information. Fadama II reduced the 
demand for soil fertility management technologies. The decline likely reflects 
the project’s focus on providing postproduction advisory services and suggests 
the need for the project to increase its support for soil fertility management 
and thus limit the potential for land degradation resulting from increased 
agricultural productivity. However, the program increased the probability 
xiiithat participating farmers would adopt soil fertility practices. Fadama II 
may have prompted farmers to adopt soil fertility management practices to 
maximize returns to their investments. For example, farmers who invested 
in irrigation infrastructure were also more likely to use fertilizer and organic 
manure on the irrigated crops.
  Overall, Fadama II achieved its goal of increasing the incomes of the benefi-
ciaries in the first year of its operation. The project also succeeded in target-
ing the poor and vulnerable in its productive-asset component, even though 
this targeting did not appear to increase significantly household incomes 
in the short term among the poorest asset tercile. The unique feature that 
might have contributed to the significant impact of the project in a short 
time is its broad approach, which addressed the major constraints limiting 
the success of CDD projects that focus on only one or two constraints. This 
result has implications for efforts to reduce poverty in low-income countries. 
Given that the poor face numerous constraints, a CDD project that simultane-
ously addresses many constraints will likely build synergies that lead to larger 
impacts than will a project that addresses only one or two constraints. Thus 
governments and donors need to pool resources and initiate multipronged 
CDD programs rather than carry out many isolated projects that are not co-
ordinated with one another.
xiv  SUMMARYCHAPTER 1
Introduction
T
he CDD approach has become a key strategy that is used by both 
governments and organizations that sponsor development assistance 
programs (Gillespie 2004; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Platteau 2004). The 
appeal of CDD arose from recent efforts to (1) empower local communities to 
participate in decisionmaking and implementation of development programs 
and (2) promote democracy and decentralization (Manor 1999; Dongier et 
al. 2001; Kohl 2003; Dasgupta and Beard 2007). Social inclusiveness is one of 
the key features of CDD programs, for the purpose of fostering involvement 
of the poor and vulnerable in such interventions. To ensure community par-
ticipation in decisionmaking, CDD programs are demand driven and support 
groups or communities rather than individuals (Dongier et al. 2001; Binswanger 
and Aiyar 2003).
  Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of CDD in achieving these objec-
tives is mixed (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Among the interesting questions that 
have captured the attention of scholars are the sustainability of donor-
supported and/or government-managed CDD and its effectiveness in target-
ing the poor and vulnerable. Khwaja (2001) observed that projects managed 
by communities were more sustainable than those managed by local govern-
ments because of better maintenance. Labonne and Chase (2008) also showed 
that CDD projects improved trust among group members, increased partici-
pation in village assemblies, and generally increased social capital among 
community members. However, Mosse (1997), Cleaver (1999), and Kleimeer 
(2000) found that CDD projects that lacked external institutional, financial, 
and technical support were not sustainable. Similarly, Labonne and Chase 
(2008) observed that CDD projects led to less investment in other projects 
and did not have significant impacts on membership in development groups 
compared to control villages.
  Targeting the poor has been found to be one of the challenges of the CDD 
approach (Farrington and Slater 2006). One argument in favor of CDD asserts 
that it can improve targeting because CDD projects make better use of local 
1knowledge to define and identify the targeted groups (Mansuri and Rao 2004). 
A recent study in Senegal showed that a CDD project increased the access 
of poor families to clean water and health services and increased their con-
sumption expenditures (Arcand and Bassole 2007). This study also noted that 
village chiefs and local governments played a major role in the placement of 
CDD projects. Several studies have also shown that CDD programs have been
effective in targeting the poor in communities with strong local institu-
tions and fairly homogeneous socioeconomic characteristics (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 1999; Conning and Kevane 2002; Platteau 2004; Galasso and Raval-
lion 2005).
  However, elite capture—in which a few individuals in a local community 
have disproportionate political or economic power and dominate community-
based planning, governance, and benefits from community-based programs—
remains one of the major challenges of the CDD approach (Dasgupta and Beard 
2007). Studies have identified cases of elite capture and failure to empower 
local communities to participate in development programs. Platteau (2004) 
observed that a large share of financial support by a foreign nongovern-
mental  organization (NGO) to farmer organizations in western Africa was 
appropriated by local leaders. Consistent with Ostrom (1990), Platteau (2004) 
also observed that elite capture is a common problem for many donor-funded 
projects that support local communities with weak local institutions. Elite 
capture has even been reported in communities with strong democratic
institutions. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) observed that communities with demo-
cratic institutions in Indonesia restricted allocation of resources to their poor-
est members. Surprisingly, this study also observed better targeting of the 
poor in communities controlled by elites. Based on this observation, Dasgupta 
and Beard (2007) conclude that there is a difference between elite capture 
and elite control; in the second case, only decisions are controlled by elites, 
but resource allocation is targeted to the poor.
  Heterogeneity also leads to elite capture and ineffective focus on the 
poor. Conning and Kevane (2002) observed that the ability of CDD projects 
to target the poor in heterogeneous communities with high social inequality 
was worse than that of externally managed programs, whereas the opposite 
was true in egalitarian communities with open and transparent systems of 
decisionmaking.
  Our study assessed the impact of the CDD project Fadama II, which is the 
largest agricultural project in Nigeria. Fadama II aims to reduce poverty by 
supporting communities to acquire infrastructure and productive assets, pro-
viding demand-driven advisory services, increasing the capacity of communi-
ties to manage economic activities, and reducing conflicts among resource 
2  CHAPTER 1users. This report evaluates the impact of the project on income poverty,1 
access to productive assets, and provision of demand-driven advisory ser-
vices. It does not evaluate how the project affected the capacity to resolve 
conflicts among users of fadama resources and the capacity of beneficiaries 
to manage CDD projects.2 In this report, we also examine whether the proj-
ect succeeded in targeting the poor and the vulnerable through its poverty-
reduction efforts and productive-asset acquisitions.
  Chapter 2 supplies background on Fadama II and describes how it applied 
the CDD approach in its design and implementation. Chapter 3 briefly reviews 
the initial accomplishments of the project identified by the MTR and dis-
cusses what our study contributes beyond this review. Chapter 4 discusses the 
methods of data collection and analysis used in the study. Chapter 5 reports 
the initial impacts of Fadama II on productive-asset acquisition and house-
hold income; Chapter 6 assesses the project’s effects on demand for and use 
of advisory services. The final chapter draws conclusions and discusses the 
policy implications of the study findings, with an emphasis on strategies that 
can be used to ensure sustainability of similar projects and improve targeting 
to the poor and vulnerable.
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1 Income poverty is the most common measure of poverty. It uses income as the indicator of 
poverty. For example, individuals with incomes of less than US$1 a day are regarded as poor by 
many studies and reports (see World Bank 2007c).
2 Fadama is a Hausa word for low-lying flood plains, usually with easily accessible shallow 
groundwater. Fadama are typically waterlogged during the rainy season but retain moisture dur-
ing the dry season. These areas are considered to have high potential for economic development 
through appropriate investments in infrastructure, household assets, and technical assistance.CHAPTER 2
Fadama II: Background and Approach
Background
F
adama II is a follow-up to Fadama I (phase I of the National Fadama 
Development Project), which was implemented during 1993–99.1 
Fadama I focused mainly on crop production and largely neglected sup-
port of postproduction activities, such as commodity processing, storage, and 
marketing. The emphasis of Fadama I was on providing boreholes and pumps 
to crop farmers through simple credit arrangements. It aimed to boost aggre-
gate crop output. Fadama I worked with Fadama User Associations (FUAs), 
which the states used mainly to recover loans and decide on locations to 
develop water infrastructure.
  The design of Fadama I did not support rural infrastructure development 
and failed to consider other resource users, such as livestock producers, fisher-
folk, pastoralists, and hunters. The focus on crop producers contributed to 
increased conflicts among the diverse types of users of fadama resources. In 
addition, enhanced crop production increased the surplus, but the project did 
not support postharvest technology, contributing to reduced crop prices and 
greater storage losses.
  Fadama II was first implemented in 2005 and operated in 12 states, 9 of 
which were Fadama I states (Bauchi, the Federal Capital Territory, Kaduna, 
Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, and Taraba) and three that were not (Ada-
mawa, Gombe, and Imo).2 Fadama II seeks to address the shortcomings of Fadama 
I by shifting from a top-down and supply-driven public sector development pro-
4
1 Fadama I operated in 25 states in Nigeria, of which 9 are also covered by Fadama II. The Fadama 
I states were Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, and Sokoto in the north; Benue, Federal Capital Terri-
tory, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, and Taraba in the middle belt; and Abia, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Cross 
River, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Osun, and Rivers in the south.
2 We discuss the implications of Fadama I and Fadama II sharing some states in Chapter 4. The 
projects in Bauchi, Benue, the Federal Capital Territory, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, and 
Taraba receive World Bank support. In another six states—Borno, Jigawa, Katsina, Kogi, Kwara, 
and Plateau—a version of the project was also implemented with financial support from the 
African Development Bank.gram to the CDD approach. Fadama II also includes other fadama resource users 
that the first project had ignored. As discussed later in this chapter, Fadama II 
also supports activities and services other than production.
  Consistent with the CDD approach, project activities are centered on 
Fadama User Groups (FUGs) and Fadama Community Associations (FCAs). 
An FUG comprises fadama users with a common economic interest and is 
therefore a type of economic interest group (EIG). The FUGs also included 
groups that are not related to Fadama resources. For example, beneficiaries 
formed groups around common nonfarm activities, such as the manufacture 
of women’s apparel and shoe cobbling.
  FCAs are the associations of FUGs operating in a given area. Each FCA 
designs and oversees the implementation of a local development plan, which 
becomes the blueprint of Fadama II and the development project in that 
FCA. The major productive sectors that Fadama II supports include crops, 
livestock, agroforestry, fishing, and fish farming. Addressing one of the 
weaknesses of Fadama I, Fadama II also supports postproduction activities 
that are closely linked to the project’s productive activities. These include 
agroprocessing enterprises and rural marketing service providers. As part of 
its targeting strategy, Fadama II gives special preference to groups of youth, 
female household heads (especially widows), physically challenged persons, 
the elderly, and people with HIV/AIDS. Targeted groups can belong to any of 
the productive or service sectors supported by the project. Because Fadama II 
uses the CDD approach, beneficiaries are given the chance to choose the kind 
of activities they want to pursue under the project. However, there are some 
activities that the project does not support, such as those that could lead 
to degradation of natural resources or large-scale changes in land use (NFDO 
2006). The project also does not support social services, such as building 
schools and clinics. Under the CDD approach of Fadama II, all users of fadama 
resources are encouraged to develop participatory and socially inclusive local 
development plans.
Approach
Selection Criteria for Participating States and Beneficiaries
Fadama II was designed to operate for six years (2004–10) with the goal of con-
tributing to poverty reduction in Nigeria. Actual implementation did not begin 
until September 2005, however. Even though the project focuses on states with 
significant fadama areas, it also operates in other states. For example, Lagos is 
an urban state but was selected as one of the 12 Fadama II states. Selection of 
the states was based on their readiness to manage Fadama II. States were also 
required to prepare Fadama II development programs that target the poor and 
FADAMA II: BACKGROUND AND APPROACH  5   vulnerable and ensure that the proposed projects do not lead to environmen-
tal degradation. States were also supposed to open special bank accounts and 
deposit an initial amount of money to show their commitment and readiness 
to manage the program. Assessment and selection of states was done at the 
federal level.
  The local government authorities (LGAs) in each state were selected by 
the Agricultural Development Project Executive Committee using the follow-
ing criteria:
1.   The regional authorities must be interested in the project and committed 
to paying counterpart funds on monthly basis.
2.   Active EIGs must be committed to establishing FCAs and making a detailed 
assessment of existing Fadama infrastructure.
3.   Two-thirds of the total membership of the Local Fadama Development 
Committee must be representatives of FCAs and civil society (the Commit-
tees plan and manage Fadama II activities at the local level).
4.   At least 20 percent of the membership of each Local Fadama Development 
Committee must be women.
5.   At least two qualified staff must be hired to manage Fadama development 
projects.
  Under each LGA, an FCA was formed. These were the umbrella organiza-
tions formed by individual EIGs, to which the EIGs submitted applications for 
support. The FCA selection criteria were as follows:
1.   The FCA must be legally recognized by the LGA. Recognition of the FCA is 
based on having a constitution and an executive committee. Members of 
the FCA should also be from the same LGA.
2.   The FCA must democratically elect leaders of Fadama II subprojects, con-
sisting of at least a chairperson, secretary, and a treasurer.
3.   The FCA must have a bank or savings account that is in good standing.
4.   The FCA must be committed to a socially inclusive process of Fadama 
development.
5.   The FCA must be commited to paying counterpart contributions for the 
project.
6.   The FCA must supply a written commitment to comply with the project 
guidelines.
  The prospective Fadama II FUGs and EIGs were required to meet the fol-
lowing criteria:
1.   The group must have members who come from 20–40 households and who 
join the FUG voluntarily. The FUG should also be endorsed by the LGA as 
eligible for Fadama II support. Members have to be from the same LGA.
6  CHAPTER 22.   The group must be recognized as a legal civil association with a group 
constitution and democratically elected leaders consisting of at least a 
chairperson, secretary, and treasurer.
3.   The group must have an active bank or savings account that is in good 
standing.
4.   The group must supply a written commitment to a socially inclusive approach 
and to compliance with project guidelines and agreements.
5.   The group must express interest in and commitment to the project and 
must apply for Fadama II support.
6.   The group must make regular payment of the counterpart funds on a 
monthly basis.
7.   The group must supply evidence of operational and active participation in 
an FCA or other organized EIG.
  These criteria demonstrate that less-organized communities and those 
not in groups could not benefit from Fadama II subprojects. It is also likely 
that people living in remote areas where banking services are limited are less 
likely to benefit from Fadama II.3 The requirement to pay counterpart funds 
is also a barrier to the poor, particularly in the case of expensive projects, 
such as rural infrastructure, large processing machines, and irrigation infra-
structure. To ensure the inclusion of women, the FCAs were required to have 
at least 20 percent female beneficiaries.
Project Goals and Components
The project set a target of 50 percent of all participating fadama resource 
users increasing their average real incomes by at least 20 percent compared 
with the baseline. The following five components were designed to achieve 
this goal:
1.   Rural infrastructure investment to support creation of economic infra-
structure and local public goods that would improve the productivity of 
households using fadama resources. Under this component, beneficiaries 
were required to pay 10 percent of the costs of constructing rural infra-
structure, such as rural roads, culverts, market stalls, cold storage, bore-
holes, and irrigation infrastructure.4
2.   Pilot productive-asset acquisition support to enhance the productivity and 
income of fadama resource users by facilitating the acquisition of produc-
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3 However, as discussed in Chapter 5, distance to all-weather roads did not have a significant 
impact on the probability of participating in Fadama II.
4 Later we discuss some of the challenges encountered in collecting these co-payments and the 
subsequent adjustments made to these requirements.tive assets by individuals or FUGs. Under this component, fadama resource 
users were required to pay 30 percent of the cost of the productive assets 
acquired.
3.   Demand-responsive advisory services to support advisory services that will 
enable fadama resource users to adopt output-enhancing techniques and 
more profitable marketing practices in their enterprises. Beneficiaries 
were required to pay 10 percent of the cost of providing these services.
4.   Capacity building to increase the ability of beneficiaries to assess their 
needs, participate in planning, and implement and manage economic 
activities, and to increase the capacity of the project coordinators to con-
duct monitoring and evaluation. Capacity-building support was provided 
through trained facilitators. In addition, FUG members were trained to 
negotiate and manage contracts and conduct basic financial analysis.
5.   Conflict resolution to address one of the shortcomings of Fadama I by 
increasing the capacity of FUGs to manage conflicts, which were particu-
larly serious and frequent between pastoralists and crop farmers. More 
than 98 percent of conflicts among fadama resource users were between 
pastoralists and farmers (Schoen, Hassan, and Okoli 2002). The project set 
an objective of reducing the number of conflicts by 50 percent by 2010.
  Because we evaluated the progress of the project and its income impacts 
after only one full year of implementation, this study should not be consid-
ered a final assessment of Fadama II. Rather, it is a quantitative evaluation 
of initial progress and a potentially useful baseline against which to measure 
future results.
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Past Studies on the Effects of Fadama II
T
his chapter describes the progress of Fadama II implementation based 
mainly on the MTR completed in May 2007 (World Bank 2007a). Although 
this MTR assessed many aspects of the implementation of Fadama II, 
here we focus on the outcomes analyzed in our study.
Advisory Services
Fadama II has implemented a pluralistic advisory service in which both pri-
vate and public entities provide services and funds. Advisory service provid-
ers are largely private, with only 5 percent of the services offered by public 
providers. However, funding of the advisory services is mainly public: project 
beneficiaries pay 10 percent of the cost and the project pays 90 percent. 
Thus Fadama II has created a foundation for developing demand-driven 
advisory services using a pluralistic approach, which is an important step in 
establishing sustainable services.
  The MTR states that the advisory service component achieved most of its 
objectives, although it is not clear how those achievements were measured. 
For example, the report states that 1,700 advisory services were provided 
to 1,026 FUGs. However, that achievement affected only 12 percent of the 
8,577 FUGs. It is not clear why about 88 percent of the FUGs did not receive 
advisory services. The MTR also observed collusion between advisory service
providers and FCA/FUG officials. This collusion has compromised the in-
dependent recruitment of providers and serves as one example of elite cap-
ture in CCD projects in developing countries (Mansuri and Rao 2004).
Support for Pilot Productive-Asset Acquisition
According to the MTR, the pilot productive-asset acquisition (PAA) com-
ponent was readily accepted by beneficiaries, because they obtained tan-
gible near-term benefits from the project, whereas with other components, 
like infrastructure development, capacity building, or advisory services, the 
9impacts are not as readily felt (World Bank 2007a). A total of 7,511 sub-
projects were undertaken in the PAA component, representing 67 percent of 
the subprojects undertaken in all components of Fadama II. At the time of the 
MTR, at least 67 percent of all PAA subprojects under the local development 
plans had been completed, and 27 percent were ongoing. Thus 94 percent 
of PAA subprojects have been funded and almost completed, indicating the 
effectiveness of and high demand for this component by fadama resource 
users. In the second section of Chapter 5 we quantify the value of productive 
assets acquired and measure the impact of Fadama II on PAA across several 
comparison groups.
Rural Infrastructure
The MTR reports that 2,817 rural infrastructure projects had been initiated, 
63 percent of which were completed (World Bank 2007a). This significant 
achievement is likely a result of the large amount of matching funds paid 
by the project (90 percent), a level that certainly contributed to the fast 
acceptance and implementation of the rural-infrastructure component. An 
important issue is the sustainability of the component after the project ends. 
The commitment of beneficiary communities to adequately maintain the 
infrastructure using their own resources is not yet clear but might have been 
undermined by the large contribution from the project. In addition, the 90 
percent contribution provided by the project will be costly to replicate in 
other areas.
Contribution of This Study
In general, the MTR indicates that the accomplishments of Fadama II have 
been positive for all components except monitoring and evaluation, which 
was rated as marginally satisfactory (World Bank 2007a). However, the MTR 
did not quantify the impacts of the project on community and household 
wealth or income or other expected outcomes of the project. Also, the 
approach used in the MTR did not control for factors outside the project that 
could affect outcomes. The major contribution of this study is its approach 
of investigating counterfactual nonproject communities and households as 
well as project beneficiaries, allowing better attribution of outcomes to the 
project. This approach is important for evaluating not only Fadama II but 
also many other projects whose results are studied without using comparison 
groups (Mansuri and Rao 2004).
  This study uses quasi-experimental and econometric methods to control 
for factors that could affect project outcomes. The main focus of the study is 
10  CHAPTER 3on quantifying the impacts of the project on poverty reduction, which is the 
major objective of Fadama II. We do this by examining the impact of Fadama 
II on the acquisition of productive assets, income, rural infrastructure, and 
advisory services. The analysis in this report is based on the household survey 
data only.1
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1 Other reports analyze particular impacts or components of Fadama II, including effects on 
conflict reduction, capacity building, communication and advisory services, and rural infra-
structure (Arokoyo 2007; Gbenga 2007; Yahaya 2007). The reports on advisory services and rural 
infrastructure do not use the survey data used in this study but instead use secondary data and 




his study was conducted in the 12 states participating in Fadama II. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the 12 states lie in three major agroecological 
zones (Maziya-Dixon et al. 2004): humid forest (Imo, Lagos, and Ogun), 
moist savannah (Adamawa, the Federal Capital Territory, Oyo, and Taraba), 
and dry savannah (Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Kebbi, and Niger). In each partici-
pating state, the project was implemented in 10 selected LGAs.
Sample Selection
Household Survey
To analyze the impact of Fadama II on beneficiaries and the spillover of 
benefits to nonparticipants living in Fadama II communities, we divided the 
sampling frame into three strata: (1) households with at least one member 
participating directly in the project, (2) households living in Fadama II com-
munities but not directly participating in the project (although they might 
benefit indirectly), and (3) households living in fadama resource areas outside 
the Fadama II LGAs but with socioeconomic and biophysical characteristics 
comparable to Fadama II communities in the same state. We expected non-
beneficiaries living in communities participating in Fadama II to be affected 
by spillovers, such as construction of rural infrastructure and provision of 
advisory services. For example, project participants living in a Fadama II 
community that built a culvert could use the same road to transport their 
produce, and information about new technologies provided by the Fadama II 
advisory services might be shared with nonparticipants.
  This stratification was designed to allow for estimation of the direct 
and indirect effects of Fadama II. By comparing project outcomes for direct 
beneficiaries with outcomes for similar (in terms of initial productive-asset 
endowments, education, and so forth) nonparticipating households in the 
same communities, we obtained an estimate of the direct impacts of Fadama 
II participation. Because nonparticipating households in the Fadama II com-
12munities may have benefited from spillover effects, this comparison does not 
provide an estimate of the full impact of the project. Comparing Fadama II 
beneficiaries to similar households in similar communities not included in 
the project provides a better estimate of the total impact of the project on 
beneficiaries (assuming that spillovers do not affect households in the com-
munities outside the project in the relatively short time frame of the study). 
Likewise, comparing nonparticipants in Fadama II communities with similar 
households in communities outside the project provides an estimate of the 
impact of spillover effects on nonparticipants in project communities.
  As with Fadama I, the selection of states to participate in Fadama II was 
not random. The 12 participating states and the local fadama resource areas 
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Figure 4.1  Map of Nigeria showing states that participated in the 
Fadama programswhere the project operated were selected by the Government of Nigeria in 
collaboration with the World Bank.1 Purposive sampling is common with many 
government-funded programs in developing countries (Duflo, Glennerster, 
and Kremer 2006). This process introduces a selection bias and weakens the
external validity of our results. Most of the states chosen were in the humid and
dry savannah zones. As previously stated, 9 of the 12 states also participated 
in the Fadama I project. Fadama II did not give special preference to or 
bias against Fadama I beneficiaries. However, former Fadama I beneficiaries 
might have derived an advantage because of their prior membership in FUAs. 
Each Fadama II beneficiary is required to be a member of an FUG, which can 
be based on an FUA formed under Fadama I. This could have introduced some 
selection bias in sampling Fadama II beneficiaries, because FUA members in 
the nine Fadama I states were more likely to be Fadama II beneficiaries and 
thus more likely to be sampled than were non-FUA members.2
  At the LGA level, the sampling procedure involved randomly selecting 4 
LGAs from among the 10 in each state participating in Fadama II. One FCA
was randomly selected from each of the four LGAs, and then 25 house-
holds were randomly drawn from each FCA. This approach was designed to 
result in a sample size of 100 households for each household type (direct 
project beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries living in Fadama II LGAs, and house-
holds outside Fadama II LGAs) in each state, for a total sample of 3,600
households. However, as shown in Table 4.1, some field teams randomly sam-
pled more than 25 households per FCA but used the same approach used for 
the planned sample, resulting in a total sample size of 3,750 households, of 
which 28 percent are female-headed households.3 The sampling frame for 
the Fadama II FCA was stratified to ensure that all 14 FUGs supported by the 
project (where they existed in the sample FCA) were included in the list.4 
Households were randomly selected both from the treatment and control 
communities. Given that it is possible for some EIGs funded by Fadama II 
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1 The project planners did not take randomization into account when designing Fadama II. This 
study was initiated about a year after the project started, and so did not influence the design 
of the project.
2 The double-difference estimator that we used in the impact evaluation helps to address the 
effects of such differences in initial conditions by subtracting out their additive fixed effects.
However, it does not completely solve the potential problem of selection bias, because the 
impacts of Fadama II may interact with participation in Fadama I. These issues are discussed 
further in Chapter 5.
3 At the national level, 18 percent of rural household heads are female (NBS 2005). However, 
Fadama II targeted women—hence the overrepresentation in the sample households.
4 The 14 FUGs were crop farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, livestock farmers, hunters, gatherers, 
agroforesters, agroprocessors, service providers, elderly persons, widows, people living with 
HIV/AIDS, unemployed youths, and physically challenged persons.to have more than one household member belonging to it, sampling at the 
household level ensured that each household in a community had an equal 
chance of being selected. Each sampled respondent—which was usually the 
household head—supplied data for the entire household. Individual-specific 
information in the questionnaire was asked with respect to the household 
head. The sampling frame of the household survey was also stratified by the 
gender of the household head, ensuring that a quarter of the households from 
each FCA were female-headed households.
  Selection of nonbeneficiaries living in and outside Fadama II LGAs followed 
the same procedure as just described. However, the FUG listed depended on 
the availability of EIGs comparable to those in the Fadama II. Similarly, 25 
percent of the sample consisted of female-headed households.
Focus Group Discussion
The main aim of the community-level focus group discussion was to discuss 
community organizations, rural infrastructure, and conflicts over resource use. 
The sampling procedure of communities closely followed the household-level 
approach. However, only two strata were used: Fadama II and non–Fadama 
II LGAs. It was not feasible to establish spillover effects by selecting com-
munities in the neighborhood of Fadama II communities (as in the household 
survey sample), because some FCAs covered more than one village. Respon-
dent groups among the Fadama II beneficiaries were chosen from a randomly 
selected group of 10–25 individuals who did not participate in the household 
survey. The individuals were selected from the four FCAs sampled in the 
household survey. The selected individuals were then separated into two 
focus groups for the first three LGAs and into four focus groups in the fourth 
LGA. This process resulted in 10 discussion groups. The same procedure was 
used to select groups from the non–Fadama II communities; that is, the same 
LGAs selected for the household survey were used to select 10 groups of 
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Table 4.1  Planned and realized household sampling
 Sample  size
  (number of households)
Household type  Planned  Actual
FII beneficiary  1,200  1,281
Nonbeneficiary in FII LGA  1,200  1,240
Nonbeneficiary outside FII LGA  1,200  1,229
  Total  3,600  3,750
Note:   FII, Fadama II; LGA, local government authority.fadama resource users who do not benefit from Fadama II. The EIGs selected 
were closely related to those supported by Fadama II. However, establishing 
those groups was difficult, because the EIGs in non–Fadama II communities 
are generally not well organized.
Survey Instruments and Data Collection
A structured survey instrument was used for the household survey. The focus 
group discussion was semistructured; it included both structured questions 
and discussion guidelines. Structured questions were used to determine the 
extent of conflict resolution among fadama resource users and changes in 
rural infrastructure. Guidelines were used to direct qualitative discussions 
about what factors led to conflict resolution and infrastructure changes, how 
they have affected livelihoods in the community, and what needs to be done 
in the future. Each of these instruments was developed through meetings, 
discussions, and pretesting. In each state, the state team leader was respon-
sible for the administration of each type of survey instrument. However, the 
interviews were carried out by trained enumerators under the supervision of 
group team leaders. In each state, group team leaders reported to the state 
team leader at the end of each survey day.
  The double-difference analysis used in this study (explained further in the 
next section) requires baseline data of good quality. Because the baseline 
survey for Fadama II had some deficiencies (Faye and Sutherland 2006), we 
collected baseline data for Fadama II using recall information. The project 
was implemented in September 2005, only slightly more than a year before 
the survey was conducted; therefore, we expected respondents to be able to 
remember the baseline data required for two years before the survey—that 
is, for the crop years October 2004–September 2005 (2004–05) and October 
2005–September 2006 (2005–06). This recall information included data on 
household composition and size, major productive assets, and major compo-
nents of household income. Household respondents had no difficulty recall-
ing changes in household composition, size, or major productive assets since 
October 2004, but the recall of income components posed some difficulties. 
However, because income was not used as an explanatory variable in the 
analysis (unlike prior household composition and assets) but only as a depen-
dent variable, the potential for measurement error in that variable was of 
less concern, although it increased uncertainty and reduced the statistical 
power of the estimates.5
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5 In econometric analysis, measurement error in a dependent variable increases the uncertainty 
of the estimates but causes no bias (as long as the error is not correlated with the explanatory 
variables), whereas measurement error in an explanatory variable does cause a bias (Greene   The two crop years, 2004–05 and 2005–06, were comparable in terms of 
rainfall. Both years were reported to be normal in terms of agricultural produc-
tion, even though production of cereals and tubers for 2004–05 was 8 percent 
lower than for 2005–06—mainly because of delayed delivery of inputs (FEWSNET 
2006). Fortunately, however, the unfavorable production conditions affected 
both treatment and control groups—thereby netting out the effect on the 
2004–05 season.
Data Analysis
Impact assessment studies face three interrelated challenges: establishing a 
viable counterfactual (the predicted outcome in the absence of the intervention
—that is, what would have happened to the beneficiaries had they not partici-
pated in the project); attributing the impact to an intervention; and coping 
with long and unpredictable lag times (Alston and Pardey 2001; Salter and 
Martin 2001). If a project’s outcome indicator is household income, the average 
impact of the project on its beneficiaries (referred to in the impact assess-
ment literature as the average effect of the treatment on the treated [ATT]) 
is defined as the difference between the expected income earned by project 
beneficiaries while participating in the project and the expected income they 
would have received if they had not participated in the project:
  ATT = E(Y1|p = 1) – E(Y0|p = 1),  (1)
where ATT is ATT, p indicates participation in the project (p = 1 if the subject 
participated in the project, and p = 0 if the subject did not participate); Y1 is 
the outcome (household income, in this example) of the project beneficiary 
after participation in the project; and Y0 is the outcome of the same benefi-
ciary if he or she had not participated in the project.
  Unfortunately, we cannot observe the counterfactual income of the ben-
eficiaries had they not participated in the project, that is, E(Y0|p = 1). Simply 
comparing incomes of households participating in the project with those not 
participating could result in serious biases, because the two groups may be 
quite different and thus likely to have different incomes regardless of their 
participation. For example, adding and subtracting E(Y0|p = 0) on the right 
side of equation (1) results in:
  ATT = [E(Y1|p = 1) – E(Y0|p = 0)] – [E(Y0|p = 1) – E(Y0|p = 0)].  (2)
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2003). We believe that similar principles apply to the results of PSM (the quasi-experimental 
approach used in this study), although we have not seen specific articles on this issue in the 
relatively recent literature on this approach.The expression in the first set of square brackets is observable, because it is 
the difference between the incomes of the beneficiaries and nonbeneficia-
ries. The second bracketed expression is unobservable, because E(Y0|p = 1) 
is unobservable and thus represents the bias resulting from estimating ATT
as the first expression. This bias results because the incomes that non-
beneficiaries receive without the project may not be equal to the incomes that 
beneficiaries would have received without the project; that is, E(Y0|p = 1) 
may not equal E(Y0|p = 0).
  Two common sources of bias are (1) project placement or targeting bias, 
in which the location or target population of the project is not random (such 
as when some subprojects of Fadama II are targeted to the poor and vulner-
able, so that wealthier groups do not have an equal chance of participating), 
and (2) self-selection bias, in which households choose whether to participate 
and thus may be different in their experiences, endowments, and abilities.6
  The most widely accepted method to address these biases is to use an 
experimental approach to construct an estimate of the counterfactual situa-
tion by randomly assigning households to treatment (beneficiary) and control 
(nonbeneficiary) groups. Random assignment ensures that both groups are 
statistically similar (that is, that they are drawn from the same distribution) 
in both observable and unobservable characteristics, thus avoiding project 
placement and self-selection biases. Such an approach is not feasible in the 
present study, because project placement and participation decisions were 
already made before the design of the study and were probably not random. 
The notion of random assignment also conflicts with the nature of this CDD 
project, in which communities and households make their own decisions 
about whether to participate and what activities they will pursue, thus limit-
ing the ability to use a randomized approach at the outset.
  Various quasi-experimental and nonexperimental methods have been used 
to address the bias problem (for details, see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heck-
man, Ichimura, and Todd 1998; Heckman et al. 1998; Smith and Todd 2001). 
One of the most commonly used quasi-experimental methods is propensity 
score matching (PSM), which selects project beneficiaries and nonbeneficia-
ries who are as similar as possible in terms of those observable characteristics 
expected to affect project participation and outcomes.7 The difference in out-
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6 For example, a pastoralist in the state of Niger reported that he did not want to participate in 
Fadama II because similar projects in the past had failed.
7 This method is referred to as quasi-experimental because it seeks to mimic the approach of 
experiments in identifying similar treatment and control groups. However, because the compari-
son groups identified by PSM are not selected by random assignment, they may differ in un-
observed characteristics.comes between the two matched groups can be interpreted as the impact of 
the project on the beneficiaries (Smith and Todd 2001). We used this method 
to estimate the ATT for impacts of Fadama II on household productive assets, 
incomes, and indicators of access to and impact of rural infrastructure.
  The PSM method matches project beneficiaries with comparable non-
beneficiaries using a propensity score, which is the estimated probability of 
being included in the project. Only beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries with 
comparable propensity scores are used to estimate the ATT. Those who do 
not have comparable propensity scores are dropped from the comparison 
groups. In our study, 1,728 of 3,758 observations matched. Therefore we used 
only the matched observations to analyze the impact of Fadama II.
  Among the advantages of PSM over econometric regression methods is 
that it compares only comparable observations and does not rely on para-
metric assumptions to identify the impacts of projects. However, PSM is sub-
ject to the problem of selection on unobservables, meaning that the benefi-
ciary and comparison groups may differ in unobservable characteristics, even 
though they are matched in terms of observable characteristics (Heckman et al.
1998). Econometric regression methods devised to address this problem suf-
fer from the problems previously noted. As Heckman et al. (1998) further 
note, the bias resulting from comparing noncomparable observations can be 
much larger than that resulting from selection on unobservables, although 
this comparison may not be conclusively generalized.
  In this study, we address the problem of selection on unobservables by 
combining PSM with the use of the double-difference estimator.8 This estima-
tor compares changes in outcome measures (the change from before to after 
the project) between project participants and nonparticipants, rather than 
simply comparing outcome levels at one point in time:
 DD = (Yp1 – Yp0) – (Ynp1 – Ynp0), (3)
where DD is the double-difference estimator; Yp0 and Yp1 are the outcomes of 
participants before and after project start, respectively; and Ynp0 and Ynp1 are 
the outcomes of nonparticipants before and after project start, respectively.
  The advantage of the double-difference estimator is that it nets out the 
effects of any additive factors (whether observable or unobservable) that 
have fixed (time-invariant) impacts on the outcome indicator (such as the 
abilities of farmers or the inherent quality of natural resources) or that 
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8 The double-difference method is also known as the difference-in-difference method (Duflo, 
Mullainathan, and Bertrand 2004).reflect common trends affecting project participants and nonparticipants 
equally (such as changes in prices or weather) (Ravallion 2005). For example, 
if project participants and nonparticipants are different in their asset endow-
ments (mostly observable) or in their abilities (mostly unobservable), and if 
those differences have an additive and fixed effect on outcomes during the 
period studied, such differences will have no confounding effect on the esti-
mated ATT. Given that a large share of observations did not match, we sought 
to understand the impact of Fadama II on the unmatched beneficiaries. We 
did this evaluation by comparing the change in income and value of asset of 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, both of whom did not match; that is, we 
estimated DD using the straightforward equation (3), because these observa-
tions did not match. This comparison helps us to better understand the varia-
tion of the impact of the program across a wide range of beneficiaries.
  In principle, the double-difference approach can be used to assess project 
impacts without using PSM and will produce unbiased estimates of impact as 
long as these assumptions hold. However, if the project has differential effects 
on people with different levels of wealth or other observable characteristics, 
the simple double-difference estimator will produce biased estimates if par-
ticipant and nonparticipant households differ in those characteristics (Raval-
lion 2005). By combining PSM with the double-difference estimator, controls 
for differences in preproject observable characteristics can be established. 
A bias could still result from the heterogeneous or time-variant impacts of 
the unobservable differences between participants and nonparticipants. For 
example, communities and households that participated in Fadama I may 
have different responses to Fadama II than those that did not because of the 
cumulative effects of social capital developed under Fadama I, favorable or 
adverse experiences under Fadama I, or other factors.9 Such shortcomings 
are unfortunately inherent in all nonexperimental methods of impact assess-
ment (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2006). Although no solution to these 
potential problems is perfect, we believe the method we have used addresses 
these issues as well as possible in this case.
  The standard errors estimated by the double-difference method may be 
inconsistent because of serial correlation or other causes of a lack of in-
dependence among the errors. In ordinary regression models, serial correla-
tion can result from unobserved fixed effects, but by taking first differences, 
the double-difference method eliminates that source of serial correlation. 
However, serial correlation may still be a problem if more than two years of 
panel data are used (Duflo, Mullainathan, and Bertrand 2004). In our study, 
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9 Unfortunately, we did not collect information on respondents’ participation in Fadama I and 
thus could not try to test or control directly for such effects.because we used only two periods (before and after project start), we are not 
concerned about serial correlation among multiple periods. Another reason 
for the possible dependence of the errors is clustering of the sample.
  The propensity scores were computed using binary probit regression mod-
els. We estimated three probit models for three comparisons: (1) Fadama II 
beneficiaries compared with all nonbeneficiaries, (2) Fadama II beneficiaries 
compared with nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II communities, and (3) Fadama 
II beneficiaries compared with nonbeneficiaries outside Fadama II communi-
ties. The dependent variable in each model is a binary variable indicating 
whether the household was a beneficiary of the project.
  The explanatory variables used in computing the propensity scores are 
those expected to jointly determine the probability to participate in the 
project and the outcome. We focused on the determinants of income and 
productive assets when selecting the independent variables for computing 
the PSM. We assumed that rural infrastructure should be included in produc-
tive assets. These variables are summarized in Table 4.2.
  Consistent with the CDD approach, Fadama II supported economic groups 
only. Hence to better understand participation in Fadama II, we analyzed the 
determinants of membership in EIGs. This analysis adds more information to 
the PSM analysis, because the PSM model assessed the determinants of mem-
bership in Fadama II only, whereas the EIG analysis involved any economic 
group—even those that did not qualify or were not covered by Fadama II. We 
used the same covariates as those used for the PSM model (Table 4.2).
  Elite capture is one of the potential problems occurring in CDD projects. If 
the program benefits accrue more to the well-off than to poor beneficiaries, 
income distribution will be more skewed, leading to increased inequity. We 
analyzed the impact of the program across asset terciles and agroecological 
zones. We divided the beneficiaries into three groups of poverty terciles 
using the value of productive assets prior to the program as an indicator of 
wealth.
  To understand the impact of Fadama II on income distribution, we com-
puted the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation for beneficiaries 
and nonbeneficiaries before and after the project.10 We used both household 
consumption expenditure as well as income to measure the Gini coefficient.
Each of these measures has its advantages and drawbacks. The main dis-
advantage of the consumption data is measurement error. Consumption expen-
diture was collected using the household survey, and farmers were asked 
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10 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, ranging from zero if income (or any other sta-
tistic) is equal across all members of a society to one if income (or any other statistic) belongs 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.to estimate their overall consumption expenditure for two years, one year 
before the project and a year after project onset. The major consumption 
expenditure reported was for all household expenditures, including food, 
clothing, health, education, and transportation. Given the difficulty of recall-
ing consumption expenditure over the long span of time, the data are of 
limited reliability.
  Although the income data are significantly more reliable, the problem 
that arises here is that the presence of negative values for income, which is 
not uncommon, can render Gini coefficient values that are greater than 1, 
and such values are not subject to the common interpretation of a Gini co-
efficient (Chen, Tsaur, and Rhai 1982; Berrebi and Silber 1985; Stich 1996). 
In our case, income was negative for 32 percent of the surveyed households. 
Although the common meaning of the Gini coefficient is invalid for values 
greater than 1, an interpretation of an ordinal nature is still retained. That 
is, greater Gini coefficients are interpreted as indicating greater inequal-
ity, regardless of whether the measure is in the standard range. Therefore, 
we also present income inequality indicators and interpret them according 
to this convention. In addition, we also show inequality results using the 
income data after all negative income values have been set to zero. Of 
course, this practice introduces a strong downward bias on the inequality 
measures. The cutoff is problematic only if we expect the extent of down-
ward bias on the Gini to differ between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. 
Chapter 5 further discusses this problem. There we present results from all 
three welfare measures (consumption expenditure, and income and income 
with negative values normalized to zero).
  Community infrastructure, demand-driven advisory services, and other 
Fadama II benefits are public and hard to limit to participants. Hence we 
expect spillover of Fadama II benefits to nonparticipants in Fadama II LGAs. 
Thus we treat the nonparticipants in Fadama II LGAs as a treated group and 
nonparticipants in non–Fadama II LGAs a control group. We estimated PSM 
to match the observations in the two groups and then estimated ATT as 
discussed earlier in the chapter. The ATT shows the magnitude of spillovers, 
because it measures the change in the outcome as a result of spillovers.
  The results of the probit models are reported in Appendixes A and B. We 
found that Fadama II beneficiaries are more likely to be from female-headed 
and larger households than are nonbeneficiaries (both in and outside Fadama 
II LGAs). However, we observed that gender did not significantly affect mem-
bership in EIGs, suggesting that targeting of female household heads signifi-
cantly increased their probability of participating in the program compared 
to male household heads. Compared with nonparticipants in Fadama II com-
munities, Fadama II participants also tend to have older heads of household. 
24  CHAPTER 4In contrast, participants tend to be younger and have more land but reside 
farther from an all-weather road compared with nonparticipants outside 
Fadama II communities. These results suggest that Fadama II targets vulner-
able groups, such as female household heads, larger households, and people 
in more remote locations, although apparently the project also targets com-
munities with relatively large farms. It does not select for other factors, such 
as education, ownership of productive assets or livestock, and agroecological 
zone. We also observe that younger people and those in remote areas were 
more likely to participate in EIGs. Education also increased the propensity to 
participate in EIGs.
  These probit model results were used to compute the propensity scores 
that determined the PSM estimate of ATT. Several methods are possible for 
selecting matching observations (Smith and Todd 2001). We used the kernel 
matching method (using the normal density kernel), which uses a weighted 
average of neighbors (those observations within a given range in terms of the 
propensity score) of a particular observation to compute matching observa-
tions. Unlike the nearest-neighbor method, using a weighted average improves 
the efficiency of the estimator (Smith and Todd 2001). Observations outside 
the common range of propensity scores for both groups (meaning those lack-
ing common support) were dropped from the analysis. This requirement of 
common support eliminated about half of the total number of observations, 
indicating that many of the observations from the various strata were not 
comparable.
  Further testing of the comparability of the selected groups was done 
using a balancing test (Dehejia and Wahba 2002), which tests for statisti-
cally significant differences in the means of the explanatory variables used 
in the probit models between the matched groups of Fadama II participants 
and nonparticipants. In all cases, that test showed statistically insignificant 
differences in observable characteristics between the matched groups (but 
not between the unmatched samples), supporting the contention that PSM 
ensures the comparability of the comparison groups (at least in terms of 
observable characteristics).
  We used bootstrapping to compute the standard errors of the estimated 
ATT, generating robust standard errors, because the matching procedure 
matched control households to treatment households “with replacement” 
(see Abadie and Imbens [2002, 2006] on the use of bootstrapping for infer-
ence in matching estimators).11 Given that FUGs were managed by FCAs located 
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11 Sampling with replacement means that the sampled observation is replaced such that with 
repeated sampling the probability of it being randomly picked for each new draw remains the 
same.in LGAs, we expect some form of correlation among households in any given 
LGA. To account for this correlation, we estimated the bootstrapped standard 
errors of ATT with an option of clusters at the LGA level (Stata 2007). Given 
that we expect a strong correlation of the outcome in a given cluster (LGA), 
we expect that clustered standard errors will be larger than is the case for 
standard errors estimated without clustering. Hence statistical inferences from 
clustered standard errors are expected to be conservative.12
  Using the matched samples, we also analyzed the impact of Fadama II on 
demand for advisory services. In that analysis, we compared the type and rate 
of adoption of production and postproduction technologies of Fadama II benefi-
ciaries and nonbeneficiaries. We also asked the respondents using each tech-
nology whether they asked for that technology. We then compared the type of 
technologies demanded by Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries.
  Because agriculture was among the major sectors supported by Fadama 
II and the adoption of improved production and marketing technologies is 
among the strategies that beneficiaries could use to increase their incomes,
we analyzed the determinants of adoption decisions. To determine the impact
of the program on adoption decisions, participation in Fadama II was included 
as one of the covariates. Because participation in Fadama II is an endogenous 
variable, conventional methods (such as fixed-effect methods with panel 
data) will produce biased estimates. We address this problem using a two-
stage procedure, in which the estimated PSMs are used as weights in the 
regression model; the PSM weighting removes the bias stemming from any 
correlation between covariates and participation in Fadama II (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2008). The two-stage weighted regression is specified as
 Δ Yi = β0Y0 + βiΔX + τFII, (4)
where Yi is outcome i (income or value of assets), i = 1, 2; Y0 is the initial 
value of the outcome of interest, X is the vector of covariates that determine 
outcome Yi; and τ is a coefficient that measures the impact of FII. The vec-
tor X includes the same variables used for calculating PSM, because PSM is 
estimated using covariates that simultaneously affect both participation in 
the Fadama II and the outcomes of the program.
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12 Note that the estimation of standard errors using clusters affects only the standard errors and 
not the coefficients.CHAPTER 5
Empirical Results
Major Sources of Income
T
able 5.1 shows that crop production was a major source of income for 
all types of households before and after the start of Fadama II. The 
enterprise contributed more than 46 percent to the incomes of both 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries before and after project initiation. The 
contribution of crop production to household income had increased one year 
after project start for all types of respondents, but the change was especially 
large (more than 10 percent) for Fadama II beneficiaries and those nonbenefi-
ciaries outside Fadama II communities. For the Fadama II beneficiaries, the
increased contribution of crops to household income could have resulted 
from the acquisition of productive assets that helped to add value (such as 
agroprocessing equipment) or increase productivity (such as irrigation). This 
result reflects the Fadama II focus on agriculture-based subprojects. Because 
Fadama II is a CDD project, the change also reflects the beneficiaries’ demand 
for agricultural equipment and advisory services that led to increases in 
crop production. The factors contributing to the change in the contribution 
of crops to the incomes of households outside Fadama II communities remain 
unclear.
  Nonfarm activities contributed the second-largest share of household 
income before and after project inception. The contribution of nonfarm activi-
ties to household income decreased for both the Fadama II beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries living in communities not participating in Fadama II. This 
drop reflects an increase in the contribution of crops to income for those types 
of households. Fadama II supported both agricultural and nonfarm activi-
ties. The decrease in the contribution of nonfarm activities for Fadama II 
beneficiaries suggests that most chose to develop crop production and/or 
value addition for crops rather than participate in nonfarm activities. What is 
interesting is the low contribution of some activities that Fadama II supports. 
Beekeeping, hunting, gathering wild products, fish farming, and pastoral liveli-
27hoods are among the activities the project encourages but that did not con-
tribute significantly to the global average of household incomes reported in 
Table 5.1. However, for households that heavily depend on these enterprises 
(for example, in pastoral communities in northern Nigeria), their contribution 
to household income is large. Because the project is a CDD, the limited con-
tribution of those activities suggests that few beneficiaries demanded them.
Impact of Fadama II on PAA
PAA is the second-largest investment undertaken by Fadama II, after rural 
infrastructure investments (World Bank 2003). Because Fadama II supported 
PAA by FUGs rather than by individual households, we divided the produc-
tive assets into those owned by individual farmers and those owned jointly 
by EIGs. It was not easy to determine the share of value that each member 
of a group held in jointly owned productive assets. The intensity of use of 
the productive assets also differed across households within groups. For 
example, members of an EIG owning a borehole for watering animals used 
the equipment not according to how much they contributed but according 
to their needs as determined by the number of animals they owned. Our data 
collection focused on the household-level assets and did not capture the 
group-level management of productive assets. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that 
Fadama II had a large and statistically significant impact on the value of pro-
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Table 5.1  Sources of income for Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries
   Nonbeneficiaries  Nonbeneficiaries
  Beneficiaries  in FII LGAs  outside FII LGAs
Source of income  Before FII  After FII  Before FII  After FII  Before FII  After FII
Crops (nairas)  56,868  84,602  72,860  86,514  51,851  68,677
  Share of total   46.600  56.800  53.800  56.500  46.900  60.200
    income (%) 
Nonfarm (nairas)  34,428  48,724  26,566  46,367  46,416  51,805
  Share of total   48.500  41.100  38.700  39.900  43.300  39.300
    income (%) 
Livestock (nairas)  2,067  –7,754 4,444  3,504  3,931  2,219
  Share of total   4.900  2.100  7.430  3.500  9.700  0.050
    income (%) 
Other (nairas)  5,050  13,755  14,043  26,552  6,665  7,390
  Share of total   0.001  0.001  0.130  0.140  0.190  0.540
    income (%) 
Notes:   “Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 2005). 
“After FII” indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–September 2006). FII, 
Fadama II; LGA, Local government authority.ductive assets owned by groups and individuals benefiting from the project 
compared with nonbeneficiaries.
  In all comparisons reported in Table 5.2, Fadama II beneficiaries saw the 
value of group-owned productive assets increase significantly (at a statistical 
significance level of p = 0.01) across all agroecological zones (except the dry
savannah, where the increase was significant only at p = 0.10 for the un-
clustered standard-error case), all asset terciles, and both genders. The humid 
forest zone recorded the largest and significant increase in the absolute value 
of group-owned assets, whereas the dry savannah zone—where the level of 
poverty is most severe—reported the lowest (and nonsignificant) increase 
in percentage and absolute value. The same pattern is observed in the un-
matched sample results (Table 5.3).
  The poorest tercile of beneficiaries (in terms of value of assets owned 
before project start) experienced the largest increase in group-owned pro-
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Figure 5.1  Change in the value of group-owned productive assets 
resulting from participation in Fadama II
Notes:   ATT and the corresponding percentage change refer to the change in productive 
assets resulting from participation in Fadama II compared with the corresponding 
group of nonbeneficiaries. Thus these values should not be interpreted as 
referring to the change in productive assets of the corresponding control group of 
nonbeneficiaries. ATT, average effect of the treatment on the treated; FII, Fadama 
II; LGA, local government authority.ductive assets (both in terms of absolute value and percentage): an average 
increase of 91,780 percent (from only 482 to 470,865 nairas).1 The unmatched 
sample results show a similar pattern—the value of the group assets increased 
more significantly both in absolute value and percentage (Table 5.3). The 
reason for this massive increase is that ownership of group productive assets 
was relatively small for those beneficiaries before the project.2 The large 
increase in the value of jointly owned productive assets includes the value of 
the cash transfer (70 percent of the total productive-asset value) from the 
project to the beneficiaries.
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Figure 5.2  Change in the value of individually owned assets resulting 
from participation in Fadama II
Note:   ATT, average effect of the treatment on the treated; FII, Fadama II; LGA, local 
government authority.
1 This increment is not a simple difference between the before and after values. Rather, it is an 
increase that takes into account the changes of the control group, that is, ATT / value of assets 
of beneficiary before the project. These values are all in real nairas (deflated to 2003 value).
2 However, the preproject level of group assets was significantly larger for Fadama II beneficia-
ries than for nonbeneficiaries. This difference might result from a greater tendency of Fadama
II beneficiaries to have participated in group activities before the project compared to non-
beneficiaries. But it might reflect a reporting error concerning when group assets were acquired 
by Fadama II beneficiaries (that is, some Fadama II respondents may have mistakenly reported 
some of the group assets that they acquired under Fadama II as group assets owned before proj-
ect inception). If the second case is true, then the impacts of Fadama II on the acquisition of 
group assets have been underestimated.  The most common FUG productive assets acquired were water and irriga-
tion equipment, which 118 of 489 Fadama II households (24 percent) obtained 
(Table 5.4). The value of FUG water and irrigation equipment increased by 
2,771 percent (from 47,475 nairas before the project to 1,362,937 nairas by 
September 2006), highlighting the large impact that Fadama II had on the 
value of productive assets. Furthermore, individually owned water and irriga-
tion assets more than doubled in value over the same period. Total values of 
processing equipment, livestock, and building structures owned by FUGs more 
than doubled. The large increases for individual productive-asset types add 
up to a large rise in the total value of productive assets, especially for ben-
eficiaries in the poorest asset tercile, who had few productive assets before 
the project.
  The percentage increase in value of group-owned productive assets in 
the upper asset tercile that was due to Fadama II participation was only 63 
percent—the smallest—but the absolute value (of ATT) was the second largest. 
The value of productive assets owned by women’s EIGs participating in the 
project also increased significantly compared with that belonging to women’s 
groups not participating in the project. These results demonstrate that the PAA 
component succeeded in its efforts to target poor and vulnerable groups.
  Compared with all nonbeneficiaries and with nonbeneficiaries in and 
outside Fadama II communities, project beneficiaries experienced greater 
increases in the value of individually owned productive assets. The impact of 
Fadama II on these assets was not significant across all zones for the clustered 
standard errors. Comparisons between male beneficiaries and nonbeneficia-
ries showed significantly greater percentage and absolute value increases in 
the value of private productive assets for beneficiaries. Comparison of the 
ATT of individually owned assets for female-headed household beneficiaries 
and nonbeneficiaries showed no significant difference for both clustered and 
unclustered standard errors, suggesting that the impact of the program on 
female heads of households did not trickle down to private assets, which the 
program does not support (NFDO 2006). This result is to be expected, given 
that the poor cannot simultaneously afford to pay their share of the 30 per-
cent matching funds to buy the group-owned assets and at the same time buy 
private assets.
  Surprisingly, the value of individually owned productive assets of benefi-
ciaries and nonbeneficiaries decreased significantly for the humid zone, for 
all women’s groups, and for all groups in asset terciles 2 and 3 (the wealthier 
terciles) (see Table 5.3). One possible reason for this trend could be the lack 
of credit that forces potential Fadama II beneficiaries to liquidate their pri-
vate assets. This explanation is supported by the corresponding increase in 
group-owned assets for the beneficiaries in most groups studied. But as shown 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.above, there was generally an increase in the value of individually owned 
assets for most groups, even though in some cases, such increases were not 
significant and/or declined slightly. The marked differences of the matched 
and unmatching groups are likely due to the factors analyzed in the propen-
sity score regression.
  Overall, the increase in the value of productive assets was generally less 
for individually owned productive assets than for those owned by EIGs. Even 
though Fadama II did not support individuals in purchasing productive assets,
FUG members—especially male-headed households—were able to acquire such 
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Table 5.4  Value of productive assets for Fadama II beneficiaries 
(matched sample) (nairas)
  Value of productive asset
 Group-owned  Individually  owned
Type of asset  Before FIIa After  FIIa Before  FIIa After  FIIa
Production equipment  71,944  158,888  38,335  52,856
 (148,483)  (156,116)  (74,809)  (70,038)
 ( n = 18)  (n = 18)  (n = 65)  (n = 65)
Transport equipment  176,882  194,529  66,513  86,485
 (122,897)  (117,323)  (95,992)  (115,898)
 ( n = 17)  (n = 17)  (n = 127)  (n = 127)
Processing equipment  165,149  527,011  49,440  59,512
 (740,261)  (793,466)  (87,664)  (84,749)
 ( n = 69)  (n = 69)  (n = 69)  (n = 69)
Fishing equipment  43,422  147,674  111,187  91,589
 (53,878)  (167,484)  (326,758)  (174,255)
 ( n = 27)  (n = 27)  (n = 41)  (n = 41)
Water and irrigation  47,475  1,362,937  17,000  63,331
  equipment  (205,301)  (1,440,951)  (28,967)  (124,446)
 ( n = 118)  (n = 118)  (n = 74)  (n = 74)
Livestock equipment  38,482  447,900  16,964  41,385
 (113,752)  (492,751)  (34,555)  (97,515)
 ( n = 31)  (n = 31)  (n = 49)  (n = 49)
Building structures  139,903  512,419  92,504  119,024
 (624,995)  (1,018,658)  (203,157)  (232,709)
 ( n = 31)  (n = 31)  (n = 50)  (n = 50)
Notes:   Number in parentheses is the standard deviation of the corresponding mean. Produc-
tion equipment = ox plow, oxen, tractor; transport equipment = bicycle, wheelbarrow, 
pickup truck, motorcycle, other means of transport; processing equipment = honey-
processing equipment, milling machine, refrigerator, other processing equipment; 
fishing equipment = fishing gear, canoe, fishing boat engine; water and irrigation 
equipment = water pump, borehole, tube well; livestock equipment = cattle pen, 
cattle trough; building equipment = storage, fishpond. FII, Fadama II.
a“Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 2005). “After 
FII” indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–September 2006).productive assets through their groups. The individual acquiring the pri-
vate productive asset would pay the entire beneficiary contribution in the 
name of the FUG. Fadama II did not interfere with the private ownership of 
productive assets, which could explain the significant increase in the value of 
such assets for beneficiaries. Another possible explanation is that FUG mem-
bers were required to buy complementary inputs to support the jointly owned 
productive assets. For example, FUG members owning irrigation equipment 
may have needed to buy pesticide sprayers to grow irrigated vegetables. The 
statistically insignificant impact of project participation on private produc-
tive assets for beneficiaries in the poorest asset tercile and in female-headed 
households suggests that the poor and vulnerable were not able to finance 
both types of assets. The results suggest that targeting was not effective in 
increasing the individually owned assets, which are important for increasing 
the efficiency of group-owned productive assets.
  However, the estimated magnitude of the mean impacts for these groups 
was positive and large (128 percent increase for the poorest asset tercile and 
32 percent for female-headed households), even though these estimates were 
not statistically significant. Therefore, the statistical insignificance of the esti-
mates does not prove that the impacts were nonexistent; rather, it indicates 
that the variances of subsample impacts were too large to measure with the 
sample size we had. For example, the unmatched sample results show that 
participation in Fadama II significantly increased the value of individually 
owned assets for the poorest asset tercile (see Table 5.3). The differences in 
the impact of matched and unmatched samples could be due to significant dif-
ferences in the initial values of individually owned assets. As shown in Appendix 
C, the values of private productive assets for the unmatched beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries before Fadama II were significantly lower than those for the 
matched beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. The small initial value of these 
assets could explain the significant impact on poor beneficiaries. However, the 
absolute increase of the productive assets in the richest tercile was the great-
est, suggesting that the wealthy benefited more than their poor compatriots, 
even though their percentage increase was smaller.
  How are these productive assets managed, and how are their benefits 
shared among group members? These interesting questions require further 
study of the efficiency of collective ownership of productive assets and how 
the poor among FUG members benefit from such assets. Issues to investigate 
include the economic viability, maintenance, management, and operational 
efficiency of these assets. Among the benefits of studying jointly owned 
productive assets are a greater understanding of the returns to productive 
assets and how they affect the productivity of labor and other resources, and 
increased knowledge of methods for targeting poor and vulnerable groups 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  37   and how they benefit from productive assets. Our study was conducted at 
the household level and did not capture these aspects for jointly owned pro-
ductive assets. However, we did investigate the impacts of participation in 
Fadama II on household incomes, which reflects the effects of acquisition and 
use of both group and private productive assets, as well as other components 
of the project (such as the effects of rural infrastructure investments and 
agricultural advisory services).
  Another interesting question to explore is the sustainability of the Fadama 
II success story beyond the project period and how it can be replicated in 
communities that did not benefit from the project. The major constraint 
faced by poor households is their ability to finance the acquisition of high-
value assets without some form of support from projects or credit services. 
Fadama II did not involve credit service providers because of the high inter-
est they charge and their limited availability. Thus alternative sources of 
credit were used by the 14 percent of beneficiaries who had access to credit 
services (Table 5.5). Relatives, social clubs, and friends were reported to be
the major sources of credit for Fadama beneficiaries as well as for non-
beneficiaries in and outside Fadama II communities. This finding underscores 
the limited options of poor beneficiaries to pay their 30 percent contribution 
to productive assets.
  It is not clear how the poor were able to pay their contributions and if 
they were able to manage assets efficiently.3 Those who could not otherwise 
secure the necessary funds may have used financing through wealthier friends
or relatives (see Table 5.5). For example, an eligible but poor beneficiary 
could have entered into a rental agreement whereby an ineligible rich person 
paid the beneficiary’s contribution and then asked the beneficiary to pay a 
premium for a specified period, or to share use of the productive asset or 
part of the returns. In some cases, an ineligible person could own the produc-
tive asset after paying the contribution of all beneficiaries and then rent the 
productive asset back to the beneficiaries. For example, a woman in one FUG 
reported that she entered into a rental agreement with a wealthy man who 
paid her beneficiary contribution for a milling machine. Such arrangements 
could affect the targeting of the poorest.
  The World Bank supervision mission of February 2007 noted that most of 
the subprojects for women and the vulnerable had not been implemented, 
because these groups could not pay their contributions (World Bank 2007a, 
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3 It is still too early to tell how FUGs managed and benefited from their productive assets. How-
ever, the MTR concluded that the capacity to manage some productive assets was low and there 
was still need for building the capacity of FUGs to manage their assets efficiently (World Bank 
2007a).2007b). The mission also noted that most of the processing equipment 
acquired by women was operated by hired hands who benefited more than 
the project beneficiaries. The Bank thus recommended that the beneficiary 
contribution for women and the vulnerable be reduced to 10 percent. Initially 
the project set the contribution of beneficiaries of the PAA component to 40 
percent of the value of the productive asset (NFDO 2006), but reduced it to 
30 percent because of overwhelming evidence of the failure of the poor to 
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Table 5.5  Access to credit, 2005–06
 Nonbeneficiaries
 FII  In  FII  Outside
 beneficiaries  LGAs  FII  LGAs
Type of access  (n = 621)   (n = 568)  (n = 539)  Total  Testa
Has access to credit (share   0.176  0.089  0.141  0.137  b,c
    of households)  (0.381)  (0.286)  (0.348)  (0.343)
Source of credit (proportion of 
    households with access)
  Banks  0.073  0.118  0.118  0.097
 (0.262)  (0.325)  (0.325)  (0.297)
  Relatives, social clubs, and   0.220  0.250  0.289  0.249
    friends  (0.416)  (0.437)  (0.457)  (0.433)
  Cooperatives  0.186  0.308  0.179  0.210
 (0.391)  (0.466)  (0.386)  (0.408)
  Farmer associations  0.046  0.020  0.013  0.030
 (0.210)  (0.140)  (0.115)  (0.170)
  NACRDB  0.130  0.115  0.113  0.121
 (0.338)  (0.323)  (0.318)  (0.327)
  Local government  0.018  0.059  0.013  0.025
 (0.135)  (0.238)  (0.115)  (0.158)
  Nongovernmental organizations  0.037  0.000  0.013  0.021
 (0.189)  (0.000)  (0.115)  (0.144)
  State government  0.037  0.039  0.039  0.038
 (0.189)  (0.196)  (0.196)  (0.192)
  Fadama II  0.109  0.020  0.000  0.055  b,d
 (0.313)  (0.140)  (0.000)  (0.228)
  Other  0.046  0.000  0.039  0.034
 (0.210)  (0.000)  (0.196)  (0.181) 
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. FII, Fadama II; LGA, local government author-
ity; NACRDB, Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank.
aEmpty cells imply paired comparison of any two groups in the corresponding columns that are not sta-
tistically different at the 5 percent level.
bDifference between FII beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries living in the same LGA is significant at the 
5 percent level.
cDifference between nonbeneficiaries living in and those living outside FII LGAs is significant at the 
5 percent level.
dDifference between FII beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries living outside FII LGAs is significant at the 
5 percent level.pay their share. Even the 30 percent contribution might be high for expen-
sive productive assets and force FUG members who are unable to pay their 
contribution to turn to more wealthy individuals for credit support or rental 
arrangements. Planners for the next phase of the project (Fadama III) need 
to consider the use of sustainable financing for targeted groups—for example, 
through microfinancing institutions. Existing local rotating savings and credit 
schemes, such as esusu, dashi, and adashi, could help to increase credit 
access (Bascom 1952; Okonjo 1979; Bouman 1995).
Impact of Fadama II on Household Income
Figure 5.3 shows that the average annual household income after Fadama II 
started (2005–06) for all types of households ranged from 43,298 to 108,625 
nairas (real value in 2003). The lower limit is above the average rural house-
hold income of 42,644 nairas reported by the 2003–04 living standard survey 
(FOS 2004) but of the same order of magnitude. On average, the real incomes 
of Fadama II beneficiaries increased 58.5 percent as a result of participation 
in the project, based on the PSM and double-difference estimation (ATT); 
that increase is well above the Fadama II target of 20 percent for half of the 
beneficiaries after six years of operation.
  Results of the unmatched sample showed that the incomes of beneficia-
ries increased by 38 percent. In contrast, average real incomes of all non-
beneficiaries increased by only 15.5 percent and by even less for nonbeneficia-
ries outside Fadama II communities (12.7 percent).4 The mean increase in 
income for beneficiaries was significantly different from that for nonbenefi-
ciaries at p = 0.05. Considering the income of beneficiaries before and after 
the project (without controlling for other reasons for income to change), 
about 42 percent of beneficiaries increased their incomes by at least 20 
percent in the first year of Fadama II (Table 5.6). In contrast, the share of 
nonbeneficiaries who increased their incomes by at least 20 percent was only 
34 percent. Although this percentage includes the effects of other factors 
that influence income changes over time, it is clear that Fadama II achieved 
considerable success in its first year of operation.
  It is likely that the impact of the project on incomes will be larger in the 
future because of the delayed effects of investments in productive assets, 
infrastructure, and other project investments. Even without longer term 
lags, the impacts on incomes in 2005–06 could be expected to be less than 
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4 The percentage changes of the nonbeneficiaries before and after project inception are not 
reported in the table but are calculated using the following simple formula (symbols are as 
defined in equation (3)): [(Ynp1 – Ynp0)/Ynp0] × 100.EMPIRICAL RESULTS  41   
Figure 5.3  Household income one year before and one year after 
Fadama II started
Notes:   “Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 
2005). “After FII” indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–
September 2006). FII, Fadama II; LGA, local government authority.
Table 5.6  Achievement of target increase in income among Fadama II 
beneficiaries
  Change in real income
  before and after FII (%)a
Treatment type  ≤20 20–50  ≥50
FII beneficiaries (n = 1,281)  57.9  11.9  30.1
All nonbeneficiaries (n = 1,240)  66.2  12.6  21.1
Nonbeneficiaries in FII LGAs (n = 1,240)  65.1  15.5  19.4
Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs (n = 1,229)  67.5  9.2  23.2
Note:   FII, Fadama II; LGA, local government authority.
a“Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 2005). “After 
FII” indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–September 2006).proportionate to the increase in productive assets from September 2005 (at 
the beginning of project implementation) to September 2006 (the date for 
measuring changes in productive assets after project start), because many 
of the investments in productive assets occurring between September 2005 
and September 2006 may not have come soon enough to affect agricultural 
production and income during the 2005–06 production year. We would expect 
the full effects of those assets acquired by September 2006 to be felt during 
2006–07. Further research on the impacts of Fadama II is needed to more fully 
assess income changes resulting from the project.
  The effects of Fadama II varied across the three major agroecological 
zones of Nigeria (Table 5.7). The project had a significant impact (at p = 0.10)
in the dry savannah zone, where participation in the project led to an average
increase in income of 79 percent. Increase in the absolute ATT value was also
greatest in this zone. Corresponding results of the unmatched sample also 
showed significant impact of Fadama II only in the dry savannah zone, where 
income increased by 60 percent (Table 5.8). In the humid forest and moist 
savannah zones, the changes in net income resulting from participation in 
the project were positive but smaller than in the dry savannah zone and not 
statistically significant. The large net increase in income in the dry savan-
nah zone, where limited rainfall is a major problem, could be explained by 
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Table 5.7  Impact of Fadama II on household income across agroecological 
zones, gender, and asset terciles (matched sample)
       Net  change
       due  to
       participationc
Characteristic / treatment type  Before FIIa After  FIIa ATTb (%)
Agroecological zone
  Humid forest zone
    FII beneficiaries (n = 176)  87,431  112,626    
 (292,102)  (299,102) 
14,963 17.1
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 282)  12,307  31,343 
 (257,170)  (276,530)
  Moist savannah zone
    FII beneficiaries (n = 118)  70,578  74,295  
 (203,342)  (280,596) 
33,522 47.5
 
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 251)  96,498  77,384 
 (258,137)  (271,796)
  Dry savannah zone
    FII beneficiaries (n = 205)  79,113  124,458  
 (255,967)  (225,341) 
62,664*/†† 79.2
 
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 335)  106,066  142,708 
 (255,201)  (254,173)
Net real annual household 
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Table 5.7  Continued
       Net  change
       due  to
       participationc
Characteristic / treatment type  Before FIIa After  FIIa ATTb (%)
Gender of household head
  FII beneficiaries
    Male (n = 311)  83,691  107,454  
 (280,998)  (282,103) 
–749  –0.9
 
    Female (n = 198)  74,284  110,454 
 (217,805)  (239,427)
  Female
    FII beneficiaries (n = 198)  74,326  110,383  
 (217,819)  (239,400) 
51,303**/NS 69.1
 
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 178)  35,414  48,346 
 (210,009)  (219,474)
  Male
    FII beneficiaries (n = 674)  83,701  107,495  
 (281,080)  (282,132) 
84,825***/†† 101.3
 
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 267)  86,261  98,249 
 (269,010)  (281,306)
Asset tercile
  Tercile 1 (poorest)     
    FII beneficiaries (n = 293)  70,851  82,745 
 (154,438)  (153,922) 
31,776 44.9
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 505)  76,831  77,511 
 (153,000)  (153,998)
  Tercile 2
    FII beneficiaries (n = 93)  93,847  119,013  
 (161,254)  (175,283) 
94,750**/†† 101.0
 
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 191)  74,705  104,994 
 (163,651)  (180,714)
  Tercile 3 (wealthiest)
    FII beneficiaries (n = 96)  122,074  154,892  
 (239,037)  (267,235) 
1,177 1.0
 
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 139)  126,474  128,269
 (207,494)  (223,225)
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the corresponding mean (without cluster-
ing). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, with-
out clustering; †† indicates significance at the 5 percent level with clustering. Coefficients 
without * or † are not significant for either clustered or unclustered standard errors. ATT, 
average effect of treatment on the treated; FII, Fadama II; NS, not significant.
a“Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 2005). “After FII” 
indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–September 2006).
bATT is computed as [E(Y1|p = 1) – E(Y0|p = 0)] – [E(Y0|p = 1) – E(Y0|p = 0)]. See equation (1) in the 
text for definitions of the variables. ATT and the corresponding Change column refer to the change 
in income resulting from participation in Fadama II compared with the corresponding group of non-
beneficiaries. Thus they should not be interpreted as referring to the change in the income of the cor-
responding control group of nonbeneficiaries.
cNet change due to participation in Fadama II is calculated as (ATT/Yp0) × 100. Yp0 is defined in the text.
Net real annual household 
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Table 5.8  Impact of Fadama II on household income across agroecological 
zones, gender, and asset terciles (unmatched sample)
 Household  income
         Change
       Double  due to
Characteristic /  Before FIIa After  FIIa differenceb  participationc 
treatment type  (nairas)  (nairas)  (nairas)  (%)
FII beneficiaries (n = 660)  74,869  101,469  28,715**  38
 All noneneficiaries (n = 1,388)  85,942  108,215
Agroecological zone
  Humid forest zone
    FII beneficiaries(n = 100)  45,190  38,461  –32,957  –73
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 185)  35,562  44,881
  Moist savannah zone
    FII beneficiaries (n = 200)  75,040  78,430  23,212  31
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 399)  97,852  106,693
  Dry savannah zone
    FII beneficiaries (n = 360)  83,764  133,654  50,408***  60
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 804)  92,304  125,507
Gender of household head
  Female
    FII beneficiaries (n = 257)  61,093  88,615  12,919  21
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 388)  50,716  67,455
  Male
    FII beneficiaries (n = 403)  84,539  110,950  40,255**  48
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 987)  102,064  126,886
Asset tercile
  Tercile 1 (poorest)
    FII beneficiaries (n = 454)  66,384  89,535  29,664**  45
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 877)  78,823  105,937
  Tercile 2
    FII beneficiaries (n = 109)  100,630  117,934  27,744  28
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 305)  105,242  119,937
  Tercile 3 (wealthiest)
    FII beneficiaries (n = 95)  81,323  135,746  23,517  29
    All nonbeneficiaries (n = 197)  95,346  105,431
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the corresponding mean (without 
clustering). ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. FII, 
Fadama II.
a“Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 2005). “After FII” 
indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–September 2006).
bDouble difference (DD) is calculated as (Yp1 – Yp0) – (Ynp1 – Ynp0). The variables are defined in the text.
cChange due to participation in project is calculated as (DD/Yp0) × 100; Yp0 is defined in the text.the acquisition of irrigation facilities and water equipment, which address a 
major production constraint in that zone.
  A comparison of male- versus female-headed beneficiary households 
showed no significant difference in incomes before or after the project. Income 
changes for female-headed beneficiary households were significantly greater 
than those for female-headed nonbeneficiary households for the unclustered 
standard-error case but were not significant for the clustered standard-error 
case.
  Similarly, in the unmatched sample, the change in incomes of female-
headed beneficiary (compared to nonbeneficiary) households was not signifi-
cant at 10 percent (Table 5.8). These results suggest that Fadama II had little 
impact on the short-term incomes of vulnerable beneficiaries. The results are 
consistent with those we observed for individually owned productive assets. 
We found that the project significantly increased income for male-headed 
beneficiary (relative to nonbeneficiary) households, with a higher estimated 
percentage and absolute value of ATT for male- than for female-headed 
households. We found comparable results for the unmatched sample (see Table 
5.8). The results suggest male-headed households experienced a much larger 
short-term impact on their incomes than did female-headed households.
  Concerning the effects of Fadama II on the three asset terciles, only 
those Fadama II beneficiaries in the second tercile increased their incomes 
significantly more (at p = 0.05) than the nonbeneficiaries in that tercile. The 
percentage and absolute value increases for the second tercile were the larg-
est of the three terciles. This finding indicates that the project had less of an 
immediate impact on poverty reduction among the poorest households than 
on others. However, the magnitude of the estimated impact on incomes of 
the poorest asset tercile is large (45 percent, although it is statistically in-
significant, reflecting the high variance of this estimate).5 Comparable results 
for the unmatched sample show that the incomes of beneficiaries in the poor-
est tercile increased significantly by 45 percent, while the middle- and upper-
tercile income changes increased but the increase was not significant at 10 
percent. Still, the incomes of the poorest asset tercile appear to have been 
affected less than those of the second tercile, possibly because of the initial 
investments that the poor had to make to participate in the project. Such 
investments could have crowded out short-term investments for the poorest, 
most liquidity-constrained households that could have otherwise increased 
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5 The lack of statistical significance of impacts in the estimation subsamples was partly caused 
by reduced sample size, which depresses statistical power, and does not necessarily mean that 
Fadama II had no impact in those cases. A larger survey sample would have been required to 
identify impacts with statistical confidence in such subgroups.their incomes in the first year of participation. It is likely that beneficiaries in 
the poorest tercile will see their incomes increase significantly after starting 
to benefit from their investments in productive assets, which, as discussed 
above, increased significantly. The significant impact of Fadama II on the 
unmatched sample could be due to nonproject effects. These results under-
score the important role that initial conditions play in benefiting from CDD 
that targets the poor. Hence in addition to the strong institutions required to 
address elite capture, initial conditions of wealth also could limit the impact 
of well-targeted CDD projects on women and the poor. Such beneficiaries 
may not benefit as much as men and the well-off beneficiaries—at least in 
the short run.
  Here we relay a brief example that illustrates the large impact of the 
program on beneficiary incomes.6 A group of 20 women from Adamawa joined 
Fadama II, raised money to pay for the matching funds, and acquired a mill-
ing machine. The average daily income from the milling machine is at least 
1,000 nairas, which is 50 nairas per group member or 11,250 nairas per year—
assuming the machine works for only five days a week and for 45 weeks per 
year. This amount is equivalent to a 35 percent increase in income for the 
female-headed households whose per household income was 35,000 nairas 
per year before joining Fadama II.
  In summary, beneficiaries of Fadama II have realized significant increases 
in their incomes. Using the PSM and double-difference methods, our results 
allow us, with considerable confidence, to attribute the income increases 
among beneficiaries to participation in the project.
  However, the impact of Fadama II is different across agroecological zones 
and asset terciles. The impact of Fadama II on income was not statistically 
significant in the humid forest and moist savannah zones and across gender, 
although increases in mean incomes of Fadama II beneficiaries were observed 
in all cases.7 Beneficiaries in the lowest and highest asset terciles also did not 
realize statistically significant different income growth because of participa-
tion in the project (although the estimated mean impact was large and positive 
for the poorest asset tercile). The impacts of the project are not fully captured 
by this study, because the project had been in operation for only one full year 
when the survey was done; thus our results do not capture the delayed effects 
of productive assets, rural infrastructure, and other project interventions. 
However, the study has collected a good baseline that could be used to conduct 
follow-up studies to capture the longer-term impacts of the project.
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6 Other success stories of Fadama II can be accessed at <http://fadama.org/>.
7 In the unmatched sample, income of beneficiaries fell, but the change was not significant at 
p = 0.10.Spillover Effects of Fadama II
We examined the spillover effects of Fadama II by comparing income changes 
of beneficiaries with those of nonbeneficiaries living in and outside commu-
nities participating in Fadama II (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). The results show no 
significant difference between the income changes of Fadama II beneficiaries 
and nonbeneficiaries living in the same community. We also compared the 
changes in income of nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II LGAs with those of non-
beneficiaries outside Fadama II LGAs. Treating nonbeneficiaries in Fadama 
II as a treatment group (stemming from spillover effects) and nonbenefi-
ciaries outside Fadama II LGAs as the control group, we computed the PSM 
and matched the two groups. As expected, results show that there was posi-
tive spillover of the program on the incomes of nonbeneficiaries in Fadama 
II LGAs (Table 5.9). Overall, the income of nonbeneficiaries increased by 18 
percent because of spillover effects, but the increase was not significant at 
p = 0.10. The largest (and significant) spillover was observed in the moist 
savannah zone—where the absolute value of ATT of income was greatest. 
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Figure 5.4  Impact of participation in Fadama II on household income of 
beneficiaries compared with control groups
Notes:   ATT and the corresponding percentage change refer to the change in income 
resulting from participation in Fadama II compared with the corresponding group 
of nonbeneficiaries. Thus these values should not be interpreted as the change in 
income of the corresponding control group of nonbeneficiaries. ATT, average effect 
of the treatment on the treated; FII, Fadama II; LGA, local government authority.Such spillover effects enhance the provision of public services (such as exten-
sion and roads), but they encourage free riding, which could compromise the 
incentive to pay matching funds for such services.
Impact of Fadama II on Income Distribution
Fadama II targeted the poor and vulnerable groups, such as women, youth, 
the elderly, people with HIV/AIDS, and the physically challenged. Holding 
other factors constant, this targeting is likely to reduce income inequality. In 
addition to comparing the value of productive assets and income across gen-
der and asset terciles, we further analyzed the achievements of this targeting 
by examining the change in inequality over the first year of the project. As
discussed in Chapter 4, we used three measures to determine the Gini co-
efficient: Consumption expenditure, income, and normalized income (adjust-
ing negative incomes to zero). In the context of our data, there are deficien-
cies with each of these underlying welfare measures as discussed earlier, 
which is a motivation to present all three and assess whether the general 
trends with regard to inequality and project participation are robust.
  Table 5.10 shows the three inequality measures before and after project 
start for project beneficiaries and for the three categories of nonbeneficia-
ries also used in earlier analysis. The results show that the Gini coefficient of 
Fadama II beneficiaries decreased by 9, 24, and 4 percent when using consump-
tion expenditure, income, and normalized income as the welfare indicator, 
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Table 5.9  Change in income from spillover effects of Fadama II among 
nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II LGAs (matched sample)
   Change  in
Characteristic ATTa income  (%)
Nonbeneficiaries in versus those outside Fadama II LGAs  15,309  18
Agroecological zone
  Humid forest  18,931  72
  Moist savannah  42,137*  31
  Dry savannah  13,748  11
Gender of household head
  Female  7,700  30
  Male  17,073  16
Asset tercile
  Tercile 1 (poorest)  15,969  17
  Tercile 2  37,186  36
  Tercile 3 (wealthiest)  –6,117  –12
Notes:   * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. ATT, average effect of the treatment 
on the treated; LGA, local government authority.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.respectively. Moreover, the reduction in the Gini coefficient for any one welfare 
measure is greater in the case of beneficiaries than for any nonbeneficiaries. 
The last two columns in the table show the percentage of the household 
observations that have negative incomes. Overall it is quite high, which is 
why it is inadvisable to rely solely on the Gini coefficient based on normalized 
income without considering the coefficients based on the other two mea-
sures. However, note that the share of negative incomes is similar across par-
ticipation categories, suggesting that, although this Gini is downward biased, 
the bias can be expected to be similar across the participation categories, 
and it is the inequality comparison across these that is relevant.
  Despite the imperfection of the income and consumption measures for 
calculating the Gini coefficient, the robustness of the results across measures 
and across definitions of nonbeneficiary strongly suggests that the project 
contributed to the reduction of inequality. This finding is consistent with 
the results of our productive asset analysis, which showed that the value of 
group-owned productive assets increased more significantly both in terms of 
percentage increase and ATT among the poorest asset tercile than among the 
middle and upper terciles. However, the results are not consistent with the 
income results in which we observed no significant impact of Fadama II on 
income for the poorest asset tercile for the matched sample.
  We also investigated the impact of Fadama II on income distribution using 
the coefficient of variation. The income results are more reliable than the 
Gini coefficient results, which were computed using consumption expendi-
ture data. Such consumption data are less reliable than the income data, 
because they were collected by asking respondents to recall their consump-
tion expenditures over a span of two years. Table 5.11 reports the changes 
in the coefficient of variation before and after the start of Fadama II. The 
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Table 5.11  Coefficient of variation of household income before and 
after Fadama II
  Coefficient of variation
Treatment type  Before FIIa After  FIIa Change  (%)
All households (n = 3,750)  3.28  2.78  –15.2
FII beneficiaries (n = 1,281)  2.00  0.90  –55
Nonbeneficiaries in FII LGAs (n = 1,240)  0.65  0.66  1.5
Nonbeneficiaries outside FII LGAs (n = 1,229)  0.66  0.77  16.7
Note:   FII, Fadama II; LGA, local government authority.
a“Before FII” indicates the year before Fadama II started (October 2004–September 2005). “After 
FII” indicates the year after the project started (October 2005–September 2006).results show that the global coefficient of variation for income decreased by 
15 percent. The largest decrease in the dispersion of incomes was observed 
among Fadama II participants, whose income coefficient of variation fell by 
55 percent. The dispersion of incomes for nonbeneficiaries in and outside 
Fadama II LGAs increased, indicating that inequality increased among non-
beneficiaries.
  These results are consistent with those using the Gini coefficients, where 
we also found increasing inequality among all nonbeneficiaries and those 
outside Fadama II LGAs. The reductions in income inequality cannot be attrib-
uted solely to Fadama II, given that its impact on the incomes of the lowest 
asset tercile and among female-headed households was not significant. Thus 
other factors could have contributed to the reductions.
Impact of Fadama II on Advisory Services
Overview
Approaches to and the performance of agricultural extension in Nigeria have 
been changing over the past few decades (Oladele, Koyoma, and Sakagama 
2004). These changes have been driven by many factors, including political 
and policy modifications, donors, and recently by the participation of NGOs 
in funding and providing agricultural extension services (Oladele, Koyoma, 
and Sakagama 2004; Ozor et al. 2007). At present advisory services in Nigeria 
are largely provided by the Agricultural Development Program (ADP), which 
evolved from a project funded by the World Bank. The World Bank project 
started in 1974 and had a broad objective of increasing food production 
to attain food self-sufficiency (IEG 2001; Oladele, Koyoma, and Sakagama 
2004). When the project ended in 1995 with significant success in increasing 
agricultural production, the federal government adopted its approach and 
incorporated it into the new ADP. Operations of the ADP are mainly funded by 
the federal and state governments, and provision of advisory services remains
in the hands of public extension workers (Oladele, Koyoma, and Sakagama 
2004). The ADP has continued to use the traditional supply-driven approach 
and has also been characterized by poor funding and less-than-optimally 
effective advisory services (Ozor et al. 2007). These weaknesses have likely 
limited the impacts of the ADP on agricultural productivity in the country and 
on rural development in general.
  NGOs and projects have also been providing advisory services and other 
agriculture-related services (credit services and agricultural input supply). 
The approaches of the advisory services provided by NGOs and projects have 
differed, reflecting various focuses and locations in the country. Although 
the government has allowed and supported NGOs and projects, it has not yet 
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ence of NGOs and projects has created opportunities for introducing demand-
driven advisory services funded by nonpublic sources. Fadama II is one of 
the projects that provides such services. The project has also introduced 
the user-fee approach that could help in promoting pluralistic extension ser-
vices in developing countries (Umali-Deininger 1997). Fadama II beneficiaries 
contribute 10 percent of the cost of the advisory services they receive. The 
establishment of a user fee in Fadama II, demonstrating a demand-driven 
approach, is likely to serve as a good case study for the government to use 
to design policies for implementing pluralistic extension services in Nigeria 
and other developing countries. Below we discuss the performance of Fadama 
II in providing demand-driven extension services and how that has affected 
provision of production, processing, financial management, and marketing 
advisory services.
Impact of Fadama II on the Types of Technologies 
Adopted and Demanded
Table 5.12 shows that a technology used by a large percentage of households
surveyed (about one-quarter) was improved crop varieties. Another one-
quarter of Fadama II beneficiaries also used financial management technolo-
gies, probably because such use was one of the conditions for joining the proj-
ect. The technology that was demanded by the largest share of households
differed across types of household. Fadama II beneficiaries asked for post-
harvest technologies more than did nonbeneficiaries. The difference in demand 
for postharvest technologies was significant at p = 0.10. This difference could 
be a reflection of beneficiary demand to make use of the productive assets 
they had acquired through the PAA component. Surprisingly, nonbeneficiaries 
demanded financial management technologies more than did beneficiaries. 
This finding could be the result of having project facilitators who supply ben-
eficiaries with financial management technologies, preempting the need to 
ask for such technologies.
  There was no significant difference between adoption and demand for 
improved crop varieties. Nonbeneficiary demand for soil fertility management 
was significantly higher (at p = 0.05) than that of beneficiaries (10 percent 
versus 4 percent). That reflects the limited emphasis of Fadama II on soil fer-
tility technologies. However, the project has addressed soil fertility problems 
by launching an agricultural input–support component in 2006 (NFDO 2006).
  Fadama II beneficiaries also used significantly more livestock manage-
ment, postharvest handling, financial management, and agricultural market-
ing services than did nonbeneficiaries. The results suggest that Fadama II 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.support may have given the beneficiaries incentives to use new technologies 
and may have contributed to the higher incomes that beneficiaries realized.
  Table 5.13 shows that the ADP is the major provider of production tech-
nologies (improved crop varieties, soil fertility management, and livestock 
production) for both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. The ADP’s focus on 
providing mainly agricultural production technologies is similar to the pattern 
of public extension services observed in other developing countries (Qamar 
2005). However, it is interesting to note that the State Fadama Development 
Offices (SFDOs) are the source of production technologies for about 30 per-
cent of the beneficiary households who adopted those technologies.
  For both Fadama II beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, the sources of 
postharvest, marketing, and financial management advisory services are 
mainly NGOs and projects (Table 5.14). As expected, SFDOs are the major 
source of information for postharvest, financial management, and marketing 
advisory services for Fadama II beneficiaries. This predominance demon-
strates Fadama II’s support for such technologies, which Fadama I did not 
provide. Surprisingly, the SFDOs also provided postharvest, financial manage-
ment, and marketing technologies to nonbeneficiaries. However, the share 
of nonbeneficiaries who received advisory services for those technologies 
from SFDOs was lower than the share of nonbeneficiaries who received the 
corresponding technologies from the ADP. The results suggest that there is 
a spillover effect of Fadama II to nonbeneficiaries through these advisory 
services. Thus free riding is occurring: Fadama II beneficiaries contribute 10 
percent of the costs of advisory services, whereas nonbeneficiaries presum-
ably do not contribute.
  The results have implications on the user-fee arrangement that Fadama 
II employs. Collection of user fees from non–Fadama II households could be 
difficult, because they may not be in organized groups and may not have any 
form of contract that could facilitate the collection of fees. Additionally, 
some advisory services are provided using mass media, which makes it dif-
ficult to collect fees from those who benefit from such services. Even though 
Ozor et al. (2007) observed that most farmers expressed willingness to pay 
for advisory services, payment of user fees by poor farmers who produce 
low-value crops is a major problem in low-income countries (Qamar 2005), 
and 100 percent public funding of advisory services for such farmers may still 
remain the only viable option.
  It is also interesting to note that farmer groups and individual farmers 
are important providers of some advisory services. For example, 25 percent 
of nonbeneficiaries received agricultural marketing advisory services from 
fellow farmers. Fadama II has also used radio and television programs to 
promote various technologies. Radio is an especially important tool for dis-
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Table 5.13  Sources of advisory services by type of production technology
  Proportion of householdsa
 FII  All  Paired
Technology / source of information  beneficiaries  nonbeneficiaries  test p value
Improved crop varieties  n = 149  n = 277
  Agricultural Development Program  0.49 (0.03)  0.55 (0.04)  0.271
  Individual  0.05 (0.02)  0.07 (0.02)  0.448
  Fadama User Association / Fadama   0.10 (0.03)  0.08 (0.02)  0.463
    Community Association 
  Farmer association  0.03 (0.02)  0.01 (0.01)  0.043**
  Radio/television  0.11 (0.03)  0.04 (0.01)  0.011***
  State Fadama Development Office /   0.31 (0.04)  0.04 (0.01)  0.000***
    facilitator 
  Ministry of Agriculture and Natural   0.01 (0.01)  0.04 (0.01)  0.065*
    Resourcesb 
  Other  0.08 (0.02)  0.08 (0.02)  0.892
Soil fertility management  n = 79  n = 133
  Agricultural Development Program  0.59 (0.06)  0.78 (0.04)  0.002***
  Individual  0.08 (0.03)  0.07 (0.02)  0.897
  Fadama User Association / Fadama   0.13 (0.04)  0.07 (0.02)  0.128
    Community Association 
  Farmer association  0.05 (0.03)  0.03 (0.02)  0.509
  Radio/television  0.03 (0.02)  0.04 (0.02)  0.574
  State Fadama Development Office /  0.36 (0.05)  0.01 (0.01)  0.000***
      facilitator 
  Ministry of Agriculture and Natural   0.01 (0.01)  0.04 (0.02)  0.261
    Resourcesb 
  Other  0.10 (0.03)  0.09 (0.03)  0.902
Livestock management practices  n = 128  n = 172
  Agricultural Development Program  0.40 (0.04)  0.52 (0.04)  0.040**
  Individual  0.06 (0.02)  0.19 (0.03)  0.002***
  Fadama User Association / Fadama   0.12 (0.03)  0.07 (0.02)  0.143
    Community Association 
  Farmer association  0.05 (0.02)  0.04 (0.01)  0.574
  Radio/television  0.02 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01)  0.470
  State Fadama Development Office /   0.32 (0.04)  0.09 (0.02)  0.000***
    facilitator 
  Ministry of Agriculture and Natural   0.04 (0.02)  0.17 (0.03)  0.000***
    Resourcesb 
  Other  0.08 (0.02)  0.13 (0.03)  0.074*
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. FII, Fadama II.
aRefers to only those households that adopted the technology and is based on matched sample only.
bState-level ministry.56  CHAPTER 5
Table 5.14  Sources of postharvest handling, business and/or financial 
management, and marketing advisory services
  Proportion of householdsa
 FII  All  Paired
Technology / source of information  beneficiaries  nonbeneficiaries  test p value
Postharvest handling  n = 50  n = 66
  Agricultural Development Program  0.41 (0.07)  0.68 (0.05)  0.001***
  Individual  0.04 (0.03)  0.17 (0.05)  0.023**
  Fadama User Association / Fadama  0.04 (0.03)  0.07 (0.03)  0.446 
    Community Association 
  Farmer association  0.02 (0.02)  0.00 (0.00)  0.249
  Radio/television  0.02 (0.02)  0.03 (0.02)  0.738
  State Fadama Development Office /  0.70 (0.05)  0.13 (0.04)  0.000***
      facilitator 
  Other  0.04 (0.03)  0.10 (0.04)  0.1964
Business/financial management  n = 155  n = 66
  Agricultural Development Program  0.12 (0.02)  0.28 (0.04)  0.0003***
  Individual  0.01 (0.01)  0.09 (0.03)  0.0013***
  Fadama User Association / Fadama   0.07 (0.02)  0.04 (0.01)  0.3084
    Community Association 
  Farmer association  0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.01)  0.3309
  Radio/television  0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.01)  0.3309
  State Fadama Development Office /  0.68 (0.04)  0.07 (0.02)  0.0000***
    facilitator 
  Ministry of Agriculture and Natural   0.00 (0.00)  0.01 (0.01)  0.2145
    Resourcesb 
  Other  0.03 (0.01)  0.08 (0.03)  0.0267**
Agricultural marketing  n = 62  n = 77
  Agricultural Development Program  0.19 (0.05)  0.3 (0.05)  0.1360
  Individual  0.06 (0.03)  0.25 (0.05)  0.0032***
  Fadama User Association / Fadama   0.11 (0.04)  0.09 (0.03)  0.6175
    Community Association 
  Farmer association  0.03 (0.02)  0.00 (0.00)  0.1043*
  Radio/television  0.00 (0.00)  0.09 (0.03)  0.0177**
  State Fadama Development Office /   0.62 (0.06)  0.11 (0.04)  0.0000***
    facilitator 
  Other  0.03 (0.02)  0.12 (0.04)  0.0578*
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. FII, Fadama II.
aRefers to only those households that adopted the technology and based on matched sample only.
bState-level ministry.
seminating advice on agricultural technologies (Nwaerondu and Thompson 
1987). Radio communication is becoming increasingly important in rural areas, 
where private ownership of FM radios continues to spread. The major chal-
lenge in the use of mass media is to ensure that programs are accessible to all 
listeners by using local languages in rural areas. Some SFDOs, such as those in Lagos, Ogun, and states in the dry savannah zone, are using local languages 
in the projects financed by Fadama II.
Factors Affecting Adoption of Technologies
To determine the impact of Fadama II on the adoption of production and post-
production technologies, we analyzed the factors that determine adoption
of these technologies, including Fadama II participation as a covariate. 
Table 5.15 shows that participation in Fadama II significantly increased the 
propensity to adopt soil fertility technologies, despite the low demand for 
such technologies by Fadama II beneficiaries reported earlier. This result sug-
gests that the adoption of soil fertility management practices came largely 
from supply-driven approaches, an observation that is consistent with Qamar 
(2005). Participation in Fadama II also increased the adoption of business 
planning, livestock management, postharvest technologies, marketing prac-
tices (including marketing intelligence, group marketing, and bargaining), 
and financial management. In contrast, female household heads were less 
likely to adopt the last four technologies and practices. These findings on 
the impact of Fadama II participation were expected, given that Fadama II 
offered advisory services on financial and marketing issues to beneficiaries 
as part of its capacity-strengthening activities, and the difference on impact 
by gender is in line with the common phenomenon that women often have 
limited opportunity to make use of advanced technologies.
  Large families were less likely to adopt postharvest technologies, marketing, 
and business and financial management technologies, and thus are less likely 
to be involved in marketing and nonproduction technologies. Consistent with 
other studies (Scherr and Hazell 1994; Nkonya et al. 2004), education reduces 
the propensity to adopt labor-intensive technologies (soil and water conserva-
tion structures and soil fertility practices). However, education increases the 
probability of adopting livestock management practices, which are likely to 
have higher returns to labor, given that demand for livestock products has been 
increasing in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world because of increasing incomes 
(Delgado et al. 1999; Ogunyika and Marsh 2006). The value of rainfed land area 
reduces the probability of adopting improved crop varieties, livestock produc-
tion, postharvest technologies, financial and business management practices, 
and marketing technologies.8 This trend could be due to the adoption of crop 
varieties and marketing and financial management technologies for large-scale 
farmers prior to 2004–05, which pre-empted the need to adopt new technolo-
gies during the study period (2004–05 through 2005–06).
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8 Rainfed land area is the area of land that is not irrigated and in which crop production 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  The value of productive assets owned increased the probability of adopt-
ing all technologies, soil and water conservation practices, and postharvest 
technologies. This finding is consistent with past studies (see the review by 
Feder and Zilberman 1985) that have observed higher adoption rates among 
wealthier farmers. However, the value of productive assets is negatively 
associated with the adoption of financial management skills, which could be 
due to an adoption of such skills before the start of Fadama II. Surprisingly, 
the value of livestock does not have a significant impact on the adoption of 
any of the technologies considered. It was expected that the value of live-
stock would increase technology adoption—just as for other assets. It is pos-
sible that the farmers owning many valuable livestock—like the pastoralists 
in northern Nigeria—do not employ crop production technologies or improved 
livestock production technologies, such as livestock breeds.
  Adoption of most technologies was generally higher in both the moist and 
dry savannah zones during the study period. As expected, proximity to roads 
increased adoption of improved livestock breeds and postharvest, marketing, 
business, and financial management technologies. Similarly, proximity to 
a town encouraged adoption of financial management technologies. These 
results confirm the role that rural services play in helping farmers access pro-
duction, farm management, and marketing technologies and services. Rural 
services also encourage the adoption of technologies for the production of 
perishable products, such as milk and other animal products.
  Fadama II has focused on providing postharvest handling, agricultural 
marketing, and financial management advisory services. However, it is only 
for postharvest advisory services that beneficiaries have significantly greater 
demand compared with nonbeneficiaries (at p = 0.10). However, participa-
tion in Fadama II increased the propensity to adopt soil fertility management, 
suggesting that the program may have supplied such technology, given that 
the beneficiaries did not demand it. Nonbeneficiaries reported significantly 
greater demand for soil fertility management technologies and financial advi-
sory services than did beneficiaries (at p = 0.05).
  It is not clear why nonbeneficiaries expressed higher demand for soil fer-
tility management technologies than beneficiaries. Perhaps the public exten-
sion services provided by the ADP—the major source of advisory services for 
nonbeneficiaries—provide production technologies, which include soil fertility 
management practices. The results suggest the need to increase the provision 
of postproduction technologies—including processing, storage, marketing, 
and financial advisory services—among nonbeneficiaries. Those services are 
important for implementing the National Economic Empowerment and Devel-
opment Strategy framework, which aims to reduce poverty by transforming 
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underline the greater demand for postproduction advisory services (especially 
regarding postharvest handling) among beneficiaries and the weak demand 
for production technologies. Thus there is a need to increase the capacity 
of beneficiaries to demand production technologies to avoid potential land 
degradation.
  Fadama II has had limited impact on the provision of production advisory
services. However, the ADP has focused on providing production advisory ser-
vices using mainly a supply-driven approach. Thus the two projects appear 
to be complementing each other but use different approaches. The country 
has used several extension approaches promulgated by donors and projects
(Oladele, Koyoma, and Sakagama 2004). As it strives to reform its extension
services to be more pluralistic, the government needs to harmonize existing 
approaches and seek to use those that are complementary rather than con-
flicting (Oladele, Koyoma, and Sakagama 2004). Complementary approaches
will certainly increase the effectiveness of the advisory services. For example, 
Fadama II has already resulted in experience gained in providing demand-
driven nonproduction technologies (postharvest, marketing, and processing 
technologies), whereas the ADP has inculcated extensive experience in pro-
viding production technologies.
  However, technologies that require expensive investments with long-term 
payoffs (such as soil and water conservation structures) may have low demand 
(Qamar 2005). Therefore, their adoption may initially require the ADP supply-
driven approach. It is also important for Fadama II to invest in providing advisory 
services on production technologies, because the ADP has limited funding to 
provide such services. Provision of production advisory services will increase 
the returns from the large investment that Fadama II beneficiaries make when 
they acquire productive assets. For example, providing advisory services on 
fish farming could help to increase productivity of that new enterprise.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
I
n its first year of operation, Fadama II realized significant positive impacts 
on productive asset acquisition and household income. Using PSM and 
double-difference methods to control for project placement and self-
selection biases, we found that Fadama II dramatically increased the value 
of group-owned productive assets of the poorest beneficiaries, both in terms 
of absolute value and percentage. This increase is largely due to the subsidy 
provided to help finance the acquisition of such assets. The impact of Fadama 
II on the value of privately owned productive assets was not significant for 
female-headed households or for beneficiaries in the lowest asset tercile (the 
poorest beneficiaries). Thus targeting of the poorest individuals through group-
owned productive assets did not trickle down to private productive assets, 
which the program did not directly support. The value of private productive 
assets increased significantly for the middle and upper asset terciles. This find-
ing is to be expected, given that acquisition of private assets requires invest-
ment using the household’s own resources, which middle and high income 
beneficiaries are more likely to afford than are those in the lowest tercile.
  Household incomes improved substantially more for Fadama II benefi-
ciaries than for nonbeneficiaries, with an average increase in real income 
resulting from participation in Fadama II of about 60 percent, well above the 
target of at least a 20 percent increase that the program set out to achieve 
in six years for half of its participants. About 42 percent of beneficiaries 
increased their incomes by at least 20 percent within one year of Fadama II 
implementation, indicating that the project nearly succeeded in achieving its 
income goal in its first year of operation.1
  Comparison of the income impacts of the project across asset terciles 
shows that the project did not have a statistically significant impact on 
income among the poorest tercile (although the estimated coefficient was 
positive) and among female-headed households, despite the large and signifi-
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1 However, as noted earlier, the increase does not control for the influence of other factors that 
could have contributed to an increase in beneficiary incomes.cant impacts on group-owned productive assets reportedly available to the 
women and the poor. These results underscore the important role that initial 
conditions play in making CDD projects preferentially beneficial to the poor. 
Hence in addition to elite capture, initial conditions of wealth may also limit
the impact of well-targeted CDD projects on female-headed households 
and the poor. Female-headed households and poor beneficiaries may not 
benefit as much as male-headed households and the well-off beneficiaries—
at least in the short run. A follow-on study is required to assess the medium- 
and long-term impacts of Fadama II. Such a study will be able to capture 
the delayed effect of productive asset acquisition, infrastructure, and other 
benefits accrued from participation in Fadama II. This study was conducted 
at an early stage of the project and does not capture the delayed impacts of 
these investments.
  The results also suggest the need to help the poor access affordable credit 
services. The supervision mission and the external medium-term evaluation 
recommended further reduction of the beneficiary contribution to 10 per-
cent for women and the vulnerable (World Bank 2007a). Even though this 
recommendation addresses the short-term objective, it is not likely that the 
approach will be sustainable after the project ends. Affordable rural credit 
services are the long-term solution for the failure of the poor to be able to 
pay for productive assets. Fadama II did not involve credit service providers 
to help beneficiaries pay for their contributions. However, Fadama III, which 
started in late 2008, has addressed this problem and designed the Fadama 
Users’ Equity Fund, which will provide revolving funds managed by the farmer 
groups. Loans from this fund will be available for new and existing members. 
But there is still a need to strengthen the role of private microfinance institu-
tions to provide rural finance services to beneficiaries. For example, credit 
guarantee and intermediary programs could help poor beneficiaries to borrow 
and pay for the 30 percent matching funds and other related costs, so that 
they can benefit both in the short and long terms.
  The project had more limited impacts on income in the humid forest 
and moist savannah zones than in the dry savannah zone. That could be a 
result of investments in irrigation that beneficiaries in the dry savannah zone 
demanded over other types of productive assets to address the erratic rain-
fall in the area. Irrigation investments have a larger impact on agricultural 
productivity in moisture-stressed areas than in more humid areas.
  Fadama II had significant spillover effects in LGAs where the program 
operated. Compared to households in LGAs that did not participate in the 
program, the incomes of nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II LGAs increased by 18 
percent. However, the increase was not statistically significant. In the moist 
62  CHAPTER 6savannah zone, however, income for nonbeneficiaries in Fadama II increased 
significantly due to spillover effects. Such spillover suggests greater returns 
to public investment. These effects are also inevitable for public investments 
that are hard to limit to program participants. Spillover implies free riding, 
and it compromises the incentives for beneficiaries to pay matching funds. 
Mechanisms for introducing user fees for rural roads and for other CDD public 
investments in which beneficiaries paid matching funds should be explored.
  The impact of Fadama II on productive asset acquisition is large and statis-
tically significant across all agroecological zones, asset terciles, and genders. 
However, the change in the value of productive assets caused by participa-
tion in Fadama II was larger and more significant for group-owned productive 
assets. The dramatic increase in the value of productive assets resulting from 
participation in the project was mainly caused by the cash transfer from the 
70 percent matching funds that the project provides to FUGs. The large cash 
transfers used to implement this project raises the important question of 
whether this success story can be replicated in other states.
  Three major issues that need to be addressed in scaling up this success 
story are better targeting of poor and vulnerable groups, finding sustainable 
methods for promoting development of rural financial services, and increas-
ing the capacity of fadama resource users to manage productive assets 
efficiently. These three issues are interrelated and therefore need to be 
considered simultaneously.
  Over the first year that the project operated, the coefficient of variation 
of beneficiary incomes decreased by 55 percent, whereas that of nonbenefi-
ciaries increased, suggesting that the project contributed to the reduction 
of income inequalities. But calculation of this coefficient did not control 
for other factors that could also affect improvement in income distribution. 
Additionally, the impact of Fadama II on incomes of households in the poorest 
tercile and on female-headed households was not significant. Hence there is 
weak evidence that Fadama II improved income distribution.
  Addressing the low capacity of the poor and vulnerable to manage pro-
ductive assets efficiently calls for increased training and development of 
complementary services, such as advisory services. One of the components 
of Fadama II was provision of demand-driven advisory services. The project 
increased the demand for postharvest handling technologies but did not have 
a significant impact on the demand for financial management and market-
ing information (although it did increase adoption of these technologies). 
Fadama II reduced the demand for soil fertility management technologies, 
but it increased their adoption, suggesting that the program supplied them or 
created conditions that led farmers to adopt them. The low demand for soil 
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postproduction advisory services. In its third phase, the program will sup-
port agricultural advisory services and input support, and it has mainstreamed 
sustainable land management. These and other interventions will address 
the potential land degradation that could result from increased agricultural 
productivity.
  Overall, Fadama II has achieved its goal of increasing the incomes of its 
beneficiaries in the first year of its operation. The project has also succeeded 
in targeting the poor and vulnerable in its group-owned productive-asset 
component, even though that did not appear to significantly increase short-
term household incomes and private productive assets among the poorest 
asset tercile and female-headed households.
  The unique feature of Fadama II that may have contributed to the signifi-
cant impact of the project in a short time is its broad-based approach, which 
addresses the major constraints limiting the success of CDD projects that 
address only one or two constraints. This finding has implications on planning 
poverty-reduction efforts in low-income countries. Given that the poor face 
numerous constraints, a CDD project that simultaneously addresses many of 
them will likely build synergies that lead to larger impacts than is possible 
for a project that addresses only one or two of these constraints. Thus gov-
ernments and donors need to pool resources and initiate multipronged CDD 
projects rather than rely on a scattershot approach of instituting numerous 
isolated projects.
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Probit Regressions of Fadama II Participation 
(Matched Observations)
65
  FII beneficiaries compared with:
 All    Nonbeneficiaries  Nonbeneficiaries
  nonbeneficiaries  in FII LGAs  outside FII LGAs
   Standard  Standard  Standard
Explanatory  variable  Coefficient error Coefficient error Coefficient error
Gender of household head  0.531***  0.09  0.592***  0.11  0.549***  0.12
    (1 = female, 0 = male)
Household  size  0.021***  0.01  0.021** 0.01  0.023** 0.01
Age of household head  –0.001 0.00  0.010**  0.01 –0.013*** 0.01
  (years)
Education of household head  0.001  0.01  0.007  0.01  –0.005 0.01
    (years of formal education)
Area of rainfed land (ha)a 0.0001*  0.00  0.0001  0.00  0.0001***  0.00
Agroecological zone (compared
  with  humid  forest)
  Moist savannah  –0.067 0.12 –0.205 0.14  –0.088 0.16
  Dry savannah  –0.039 0.11 –0.06 0.12  –0.121 0.13
Distance to all-weather  0.0004  0.00  0.0002  0.000  0.005***  0.00
  roada (km)
Value of productive assetsa  –0.432 0.348  –0.642 0.420  –0.284 0.349
  (million  nairas)
Value of livestock assetsa  0.026 0.045 0.470 0.383 0.043 0.058
  (million  nairas)
Constant  –0.660*** 0.23  –0.773*** 0.27  0.332  0.30
  Sample size (n) 966    697    614
  R2 0.037    0.048    0.097
  Probability > χ2 0.000***    0.000***    0.000***
  Log likelihood  –606.16   –459.91   –379.97
Notes:   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. FII, Fadama II; 
LGA, local government authority.
aQuantities reported for the period before the project started.APPENDIX B
Determinants of Participation in 
Economic Interest Groups
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Variable  Maximum likelihood coefficient
Gender of household head (1 = female)  –0.019
Household size  0.007***
Age of household head (years)  –0.002***
Level of education of household head (years)  0.003**
Area of rainfed land in 2005 (ha)  0.076***
Value of productive assets in 2005 (nairas)  –0.014
Distance to all weather road 2005 (thousand km)  0.005***
Value of livestock in 2005 (nairas)  0.034
Agroecological zone (compared with humid forest)
  Moist savannah  0.006
  Dry savannah  –0.005
Notes:   Includes all observations. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.67
APPENDIX C
Comparative Statistics of the Matched 
and Unmatched Samples
  Treated group  Control group
Characteristic Matched  Unmatched  p-value Matched  Unmatched  p-value
Human capital
  Household size  10.7  12.5  0.001***  9.0  10.3  0.000***
  Gender of household head  0.37  0.39  0.463  0.23  0.28  0.002***
      (1 = female)
  Education of household head (years)  9.7  8.8  0.008***  9.4  8.9  0.06*
  Age of household head (years)  42.8  45.2  0.000***  42.4  43.1  0.143
  Current use of credit (1 = yes)  0.17  0.15  0.211  0.11  0.08  0.022**
  Membership in groups (1 = yes)
    Cooperative group in 2005  0.36  0.23  0.000***  0.27  0.19  0.000***
    Cooperative group in 2006  0.35  0.24  0.000***  0.31  0.18  0.000***
    Fadama User Group in 2005  0.76  0.85  0.000***  0.56  0.63  0.000***
    Fadama User Group in 2006  0.98  0.97  0.854  0.59  0.62  0.088*
Access
  Distance to town in 2005 (km)  9.3  9.4  0.943  7.4  10.1  0.000***
  Distance to town in 2006 (km)  9.0  10.6  0.124  9.5  11.2  0.017**
  Distance to market in 2005 (km)  4.3  5.8  0.131  3.5  6.1  0.000***
  Distance to market in 2006 (km)  3.8  5.6  0.020**  3.2  6.1  0.000***
Use of technologies
  Crop varieties  0.24  0.29  0.083*  0.25  0.22  0.064*
  Soil fertility  0.12  0.07  0.004***  0.11  0.08  0.006***
  Soil and water conservation  0.04  0.02  0.090*  0.02  0.01  0.336
  Livestock breeds  0.05  0.05  0.815  0.06  0.03  0.000***
  Livestock management  0.17  0.25  0.002***  0.14  0.13  0.446
  Postharvest  0.08  0.06  0.106  0.06  0.05  0.233
  Business plan  0.16  0.14  0.309  0.05  0.03  0.024**
  Financial records  0.25  0.19  0.032**  0.06  0.03  0.000***
  Marketing  0.10  0.10  0.852  0.07  0.05  0.015**
Land endowment (ha)
  Land irrigated in 2005  0.67  0.76  0.401  0.39  0.48  0.198
  Land irrigated in 2006  1.2  2.1  0.000***  1.2  1.7  0.137
  Land rainfed in 2005  3.5  2.8  0.227  2.4  2.3  0.570
  Land rainfed in 2006  4.5  4.6  0.839  3.2  3.9  0.065*
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  Treated group  Control group
Characteristic Matched  Unmatched  p-value Matched  Unmatched  p-value
Value of productive assets (nairas)
  Group assets in 2005  52,009  24,236  0.022**  5,957  8,749  0.267
  Group assets in 2006  358,619  155,841  0.000***  4,692  4,682  0.996
  Private assets in 2005  45,072  24,554  0.000***  53,657  35,779  0.000***
  Private assets in 2006  26,693  16,331  0.019**  11,142  5,850  0.001***
Household income (nairas)
  Income in 2005  72,256  74,896  0.853  67,181  85,942  0.063*
  Income in 2006  93,823  101,469  0.616  83,124  108,215  0.022**
Note:   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.References
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Community-driven development (CDD) has attracted 
the attention of governments and international organizations through its 
promise of sustainable, pro-poor development that involves local communities 
in program design and decisionmaking. Empirical evidence of CDD’s eﬀective-
ness has not been very strong, however, with some studies providing support 
to CDDs and others not. This study addresses this problem, oﬀering fresh 
analysis of CDD programs by assessing the Fadama II Project, the largest 
agricultural CDD program in Nigeria. Fadama II aimed to increase the income 
of farmers, ﬁshers, and other poor people in Nigeria’s low-lying ﬂoodplains, or 
fadama areas, where poverty is concentrated. Drawing on a survey of the 
experiences of almost two thousand Nigerians—both Fadama II participants 
and those outside the project’s parameters—the authors identify key strengths 
and weaknesses of the program. Fadama II has succeeded in raising beneﬁcia-
ries’ real incomes by roughly 60 percent and dramatically increasing the value 
of productive assets owned by private and civil society organizations. More-
over, by promoting public goods such as roads, Fadama II has even beneﬁted 
people who were not participants in the project. Nevertheless, the poorest 
households, including those headed by women, have yet to see their incomes 
increase as dramatically as those of better-oﬀ households. Also, participation 
in Fadama II depended partially on ﬁnancial contributions often beyond the 
means of poorer households. Future CDD programs need to address these 
problems through improved targeting of poor and vulnerable groups, creation 
of aﬀordable rural credit services, and other reforms. This study oﬀers a 
carefully balanced analysis that will be valuable to policymakers, donors, and 
others interested in the potential of community-driven development.   
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